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Abstract
The Design and Implementation of a Prototype Digital
Video Watermarking Scheme with Dynamic Traitor
Tracing
A. Salotto
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,
Stellenbosch University,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Thesis: MEng (Electr and Electron)
December 2014
We design and implement a prototype digital watermarking scheme that uses
spread-transform dither modulation to embed hidden binary message signals
into uncompressed digital video signals. The hidden messages are intended
to identify the original recipient of a particular copy of a digital video, so
that in the event that a pirate copy of that video is found, the recipient can be
incriminated as a pirate. We test the ability of the watermark signal to survive
various modifications to the watermarked video, including lossy compression,
frame deletion, and amplitude scaling. We find that the scheme performs
well when watermarked videos remain uncompressed, but the scheme is not
sufficiently robust against lossy compression. We also implement a dynamic
traitor tracing scheme based on the scheme of Fiat and Tassa, which is designed
to identify a group of pirates who combine their watermarked videos in an
attempt to defeat the watermarking scheme. We test the traitor tracing scheme
in a simulated digitally watermarked video broadcast system where a pirate
rebroadcast is monitored. We find that when the pirate rebroadcast is delayed,
our traitor tracing scheme identifies and disconnects the pirates more quickly
than the scheme of Fiat and Tassa.
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Uittreksel
Die Ontwerp en Implementering van ’n Digitale
Videowatermerkskema-prototipe met Dinamiese
Verraaier-opsporing
(“The Design and Implementation of a Prototype Digital Video Watermarking
Scheme with Dynamic Traitor Tracing”)
A. Salotto
Departement Elektriese en Elektroniese Ingenieurswese,
Stellenbosch Universiteit,
Privaatsak X1, Matieland 7602, Suid Afrika.
Tesis: MIng (Elektr en Elektron)
Desember 2014
Ons ontwerp en implementeer ’n digitale watermerkskema-prototipe wat
strektransform-bibbermodulasie gebruik om binêre boodskapseine in digitale
videoseine te verskuil. Die doel van die versteekte boodskappe is om die oor-
spronklike ontvanger van ’n bepaalde digitale video-afskrif te identifiseer. In-
dien ’n onwettige afskrif van die video ontdek word, kan die oorspronklike
ontvanger daarvoor verantwoordelik gehou word. Ons toets die vermoë van
die watermerksein om verskeie veranderinge aan die gewatermerkte video te
oorleef, byvoorbeeld kompressie, die verwydering van videorame, en ampli-
tudeskalering. Die skema vaar goed in die afwesigheid van videokompressie,
maar is nie robuus wanneer die video beduidend saamgepers word nie. Ons
implementeer ook ’n dinamiese skema vir verraaier-opsporing, gebaseer op ’n
tegniek deur Fiat en Tassa. Die doel van hierdie skema is om groepe gebrui-
kers te identifiseer wat saamwerk om ’n watermerkskema te kul deur gewa-
termerkte videos te kombineer. Ons toets die verraaier-opsporingskema in ’n
simulasie van ’n gewatermerkte video-uitsendingstelsel wat ’n roofuitsending
monitor. Wanneer die roofuitsending vertraag is, vind ons dat die voorgestelde
verraaier-opsporingskema die skuldige gebruikers vinniger uitwys as die skema
van Fiat en Tassa.
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qDM(z, b,∆) DM-encoded value of the host, z, for the bit, b, and
step size, ∆
qSTDM(v, b,∆, s) STDM-encoded value of the host, v for the bit, b, step
size, ∆, and chip signal, s
q˜STDM(z, b,∆, s) STDM-encoded value of the high resolution host, v, for
the bit, b, step size, ∆, and low resolution chip signal,
s
s[x, y, t] Pseudonoise chip signal
sdyn(ui, c,m
(C)) Dynamic Tardos incrimination score for user ui, for c
collaborating pirates, based on m(C)
sincr(ui,m
(C)) Tardos incrimination score for user ui, based on m(C)
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s′incr(ui,m
(C)) Symmetric incrimination score for user ui, based on
m(C)
ski [x, y, t] STDM chip signal for the ith bit of the kth video block
u(t) Unit step function
v[x, y, t] Host video signal
vk[x, y, t] The kth block of the host video signal
v˜k[x, y, t] The downsampled version of the kth block of the host
video signal
v(u)[x, y, t] Watermarked version of v[x, y, t], assigned to the user,
u
v
(u)
k [x, y, t] The k
th block of the watermarked version of v[x, y, t],
assigned to the user, u
w(u)[x, y, t] Watermark signal that encodes the message, m(u)
w
(u)
ki
[x, y, t] Watermark signal that encodes the ith bit in the kth
video block
w˜
(u)
ki
[x, y, t] Downsampled version of the watermark signal that en-
codes the ith bit in the kth video block
w
(u)
k [x, y, t] The k
th block of the watermark signal, w(u)ki [x, y, t]
zki(rˆ
′
k, θˆ
′
k) The scalar DM value calculated for rˆ′k and θˆ′k
α(t) Pixel value gain function applied by the pirate
αˆk(rˆ
′
k, θˆ
′
k) Decoder estimated gain for rˆ′k, and θˆ′k
βk(rˆ
′
k, θˆ
′
k) Likelihood score for rˆ′k, and θˆ′k
δ[x′, y′, t′] Kronecker delta
δ(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2) Optimal dynamic Tardos cut-off parameter for Nˆc pi-
rates, Nˆu codewords, 1-soundness, and 2-completeness
τ(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2) Optimal dynamic Tardos score threshold for Nˆc pirates,
Nˆu codewords, 1-soundness, and 2-completeness
Sets
C The set of pirates carrying out a collusion attack
Cˆ The set of users incriminated as pirates
D The set of users disconnected by the CP
Gp The set of user sets known to contain at least one pirate
I The set of users assumed to be innocent
Lk The “left” subset of users in the kth branch of the Fiat
and Tassa search tree
P The set of users to whom a segment received from a
pirate broadcast was originally transmitted
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PFT The set of disjoint user sets into which U is partitioned
in the Fiat and Tassa scheme
Pk The set of user sets incriminated by the watermark mes-
sage, m(W,k)
R The set of possible frame rate scaling factors tested by
the decoder
Rk The “right” subset of users in the kth branch of the Fiat
and Tassa search tree
Sp The set of user sets suspected of containing at least one
pirate
U The set of all users of video content from the CP
VC The set of watermarked videos available to the pirates
Wk The set of user sets suspected of containing at least one
pirate at the beginning of iteration k
W ′k The set of users that does not contain a detected a
pirate at the beginning of iteration k
Θ The set of possible video block offsets tested by the
decoder
Ωk The set of all possible coordinates of an STDM chip
signal
Ωki The set of coordinates for which ski [x′, y′, t′] is non-zero
Ω′ki The set of coordinates, chosen by the encoder, for which
w˜
(u)
ki
[x′, y′, t′] is non-zero
Transforms
D{·} Downsample a video block to the resolution of the ship
signal
Operators
| · | Absolute value or size of a set
b·c Integer floor
arg max(·) Argument that yields the maximum value
arg min(·) Argument that yields the minimum value
ln(·) Natural logarithm
max(·) Maximum value
O(·) Big-O notation
P (·) Probability of
round(·) Nearest integer
sgn Signum function
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weight(·) Number of non-zero function values
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In a digital video distribution system, a content provider (CP) legally dis-
tributes proprietary digital video content to a number of authorised users who
pay to access the content. Examples of such systems include pay-TV, on-
line content stores, and DVD distribution. Digital rights management (DRM)
schemes allow a CP to grant content access to authorised users, and deny ac-
cess to anyone else. An authorised user might access content, make a copy of
it, and redistribute the copy to non-paying, non-authorised users. This illegal
redistribution of proprietary content is commonly known as piracy, and the
user responsible for the redistribution is referred to as a pirate. Non-paying
users who have access to a pirate copy may be reluctant to pay the CP for
content that is available (illegally) for free. It is therefore in the interest of the
CP to prevent piracy of its content.
1.1 Motivation
While conventional DRM schemes can be effective at preventing unauthorised
users from accessing content, they have a limited ability to prevent unautho-
rised redistribution of content once it has been accessed [1]. If an authorised
user is able to view some video content, then that user can find ways to record
that content while it plays and redistribute the recording to unauthorised
users [2]. A solution to this form of piracy is to make such a recording trace-
able to the pirate, so that, upon finding a pirate copy of its content, the CP
can take action against the pirate to prevent further piracy.
In this thesis, a digital watermarking method is presented that can be
used to embed hidden information into digital video content that is intended
to remain present in any usable copy of that content. A CP can use this
method to embed unique, user-identifying information into the video content
it provides to each authorised user. A pirate copy can be traced to the pirate
by retrieving the hidden information present in the copy. A determined pirate
may attempt to destroy the incriminating information by modifying the pirate
1
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copy before redistributing it. Therefore, the watermarking scheme is designed
so that the hidden information can be retrieved after modifications are made
to the video signal. The robustness of the scheme is tested to determine how
difficult it is to remove the hidden information.
1.2 Background
Digital watermarking is the process of modifying a signal (the host) in such a
way that, to a human user, the modified signal is indistinguishable from the
original, while, using a certain technique, these modifications can be decoded
to reveal some hidden message signal. In this thesis we focus on watermark-
ing digital video signals with binary messages. We embed digital watermarks
in uncompressed digital video with the intention that the watermark signals
remain present after the watermarked videos are compressed using any com-
pression algorithm. Watermarking schemes exist that are specific to particular
compressed digital video formats. However, their usefulness is limited to the
case where videos remain in their original compressed formats [3, 4].
1.2.1 Communication Model of a Watermarking Scheme
Figure 1.1 shows a digital watermarking scheme, modelled as a communica-
tion system for the hidden message signal. We represent the binary watermark
message signal as a row vector, m(u), of bits, such that the jth bit of m(u) is
m
(u)
j . The message, m(u), uniquely identifies the user, u, who receives the wa-
termarked video. The watermarking scheme must ensure that if u distributes
a pirate copy of a video, the decoder can reproduce m(u) (or a good enough
approximation of m(u)) from that copy so that u can be incriminated with
certainty.
The encoder takes m(u) and the host signal, v, as input, and outputs a
watermark signal, w(u). This watermark is added to v to give the watermarked
signal, v(u), which is distributed to a particular user, u. The channel noise, n,
represents the distortions caused by any processes to which v(u) is subjected by
the user before it is redistributed as the pirate copy, p(u). When p(u) is found, it
is input to the decoder, which decodes from it the message, mˆ(u). Since p(u) is
a pirate copy of v(u), the watermarking scheme is successful if there is enough
information in mˆ(u) to identify u. In this thesis we will not cover the details
of the method by which the CP distributes v(u) to the user or the method by
which the CP obtains p(u).
In the digital watermarking scheme depicted in Figure 1.1, the unmarked
host signal, v, is not available to the decoder. This is known as a blind or
oblivious watermarking scheme. Having v available at the decoder simplifies
watermark detection, as well as the reversal of the processes applied in produc-
ing p(u) from v(u) [5, 6]. However, the requirement that v be available at the
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Encoder
Decoder
m(u) v
w(u) v(u)
mˆ(u)n
p(u)
User, u
Figure 1.1: Model of a blind digital watermarking scheme as a communication
system. The watermark message, m(u), is encoded into the watermark signal, w(u),
which is added to the host signal, v, to give the watermarked signal, v(u). The
user, u, receives v(u), modifies it by adding a noise signal, n, and redistributes the
pirate copy, p(u). Upon finding p(u), the watermark decoder is used to determine an
estimate, mˆ(u), of the watermark message embedded in p(u).
decoder limits watermark decoding to devices where a database of unmarked
content can be stored securely [7]. Blind decoding, on the other hand, can be
implemented on devices in the possession of users without the risk of exposing
unmarked content [8]. Due to this more widespread usefulness, in this thesis
we consider only blind watermarking schemes.
1.2.2 Properties of Digital Watermarks
An important property of digital watermarks is security. We refer to a digital
watermarking scheme as being secure if a pirate cannot encode or decode a
watermark, or modify the message m(u) at will, without knowledge of some
secret known to authorised encoders and decoders. This type of security is
similar to that of a digital signature scheme, where the receiver of a message
signed with a valid digital signature can be certain that the message was
generated by a known sender, and was not modified since it was transmitted
by that sender [9]. A secure watermarking scheme ensures that the CP does
not take action against innocent users, based on watermarks that have been
forged by the actual pirates.
A digitally watermarked signal should be perceptually similar to the un-
marked signal. We refer to this property as the fidelity of the watermarking
scheme. Noticeable distortion in the content caused by low-fidelity watermark-
ing may reduce users’ satisfaction with, and, possibly, their willingness to pay
for, content distributed by the CP [10]. It is difficult to objectively measure
the perceptibility of the distortion caused by digital watermarking, since per-
ceptibility depends on the physiology of the viewer. However, we can measure
the signal distortion caused by the watermark by comparing the relative signal
power of the host to that of the watermark signal. This metric is known as
the document-to-watermark ratio (DWR) [11, 6, 12], and is given by
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DWR =
σ2v
σ2
w(u)
, (1.2.1)
where σ2v is the variance of the host signal, v, and σ2w(u) is the variance of
the watermark signal, w(u). A high DWR indicates low levels of distortion of
the host signal, which should result in reduced quality degradation. However,
there exists a trade-off between fidelity and another important property of
digital watermarks: robustness.
We use the term “robustness” to describe the ability of a watermark signal
to resist decoding errors as the distortion applied to v(u) in producing p(u)
increases. If the identifying information in a watermarked video cannot be
decoded reliably due to distortion, then no action can be taken against the
pirate. Ideally, a watermark should be robust enough to be decoded correctly
from a pirate copy, as long as the quality of that copy is still acceptable for use.
That is, the watermark need not be robust against distortions that degrade
the pirate copy to the point that it is of no commercial value [13].
Correct decoding of the watermark message, m(u), relies on two factors.
Firstly, the bits of m(u) embedded in v(u) must remain uncorrupted in p(u).
Secondly, the decoder must decode the value of each message bit from the
location within the video signal in which that bit was embedded by the encoder.
We refer to this second condition as synchronisation. For video watermarks,
both temporal and spatial synchronisation is necessary. This can be achieved
by embedding, along with the watermark message, a known signal for which
the decoder searches. This signal, known as a template, is then used by the
decoder to reverse any temporal and spatial manipulations that were applied to
w(u) [14, 15]. A disadvantage of using templates is that the template itself can
be destroyed, preventing the decoder from synchronising [7]. When considering
the robustness of a watermarking scheme it is necessary to take into account
the nature of the distortion applied to v(u). A digital watermarking scheme may
be highly robust against some forms of distortion, yet weak against others [10].
1.2.3 Attacks on Digital Video Watermarks
Typical video processing operations that may be carried out on watermarked
videos include lossy compression, resizing, and frame rate conversion. These
operations may be carried out by the CP itself prior to distributing water-
marked videos, or by pirates before redistributing pirate copies. In addition
to these operations, pirates may subject watermarked videos to processes in-
tended to corrupt the watermark messages, or to desynchronise the encoder
and decoder, so that correct decoding and incrimination cannot occur. These
processes may include addition of noise to the video, scaling of pixel values,
deletion of frames, and frame cropping. In this thesis we refer to both of the
above classes of video manipulations as attacks.
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While a single pirate can carry out any of the attacks mentioned above, a
group of collaborating pirates can carry out a collusion attack, where the group
combines its members’ differently watermarked copies of the same content into
a new pirate copy. This attack is intended to produce a copy that bears either
a corrupted watermark, which does not identify any of the pirates, or a valid
watermark that incriminates an innocent user. If the latter is feasible for a
particular watermarking scheme, then a pirate incriminated by the presence
of a watermark in a pirate copy could reasonably claim to have been falsely
incriminated in this way.
1.2.4 Traitor Tracing Schemes
Traitor tracing schemes construct watermark messages in such a way that a
pirate copy produced by collusion can be traced with some certainty to at least
one pirate collaborator, while false incrimination is unlikely. We refer to these
message constructions as collusion-secure codes. In a static traitor tracing
scheme, collusion-secure codes are constructed prior to content distribution,
using an estimated upper bound on the number of collaborating pirates. When
a pirate copy is found, users are incriminated based on the composition of the
modified code present in the copy. Static schemes provide no certainty that all
pirates will be incriminated, and the ability of static schemes to incriminate
pirates with certainty is compromised if the number of collaborating pirates is
underestimated [16, 17].
If real-time feedback from a pirate redistribution is available, as is the case
with illegal live rebroadcast of internet multicast or pay-TV content, a dynamic
traitor tracing scheme may be used [18, 19, 16]. In a dynamic scheme, segments
of content are digitally watermarked on the fly, based on previous watermarked
segments received from a pirate redistribution. Dynamic schemes are capable
of updating estimates of the number of collaborators and immediately discon-
necting incriminated pirates until the pirate redistribution ceases [19].
1.3 Related Work
Several digital watermarking techniques have been developed for digital video,
some of which are compared in [20] and [7]. Many of these techniques transform
the host signal to another domain, embed the watermark in the transformed
host, and then apply the inverse transform to produce the watermarked video.
Transform domains used in this way include the discrete Fourier transform
(DFT) [15], discrete cosine transform (DCT) [21, 22, 23], and wavelet [24, 25]
domains. Domain transformation can make the watermark inherently robust
against certain attacks [15], but the transformation and inverse transformation
steps can be computationally intensive. Other techniques add the watermark
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
signal directly to the host signal [14]. We refer to this type of technique as
spatial domain watermarking.
Several works have focussed on collusion attacks. Chor et al. introduced
traitor tracing schemes in [26] as a means of tracing pay-TV users who com-
bine decryption keys from their decoders to produce pirate decoders. In [27],
Boneh and Shaw introduced collusion-secure codes for digital watermarks. Fiat
and Tassa introduced dynamic traitor tracing schemes in [18], and in [28]
Tassa combined a scheme from [18] with the code construction of Boneh and
Shaw to trace collaborating pirates using digitally watermarked broadcast con-
tent. Collusion-secure code constructions based on channel multiple-access
techniques are presented in [29, 30], and some other constructions are given
in [31, 32]. An alternative approach to protecting digitally watermarked im-
ages is used in both [33] and [34]. In these schemes, each watermarked copy
is slightly warped in a unique way so that combining differently watermarked
copies results in a degraded pirate copy.
1.4 Objectives
The first objective of this thesis is to develop a prototype digital watermarking
scheme for uncompressed digital video. The watermarking scheme should con-
sist of an encoder that can embed arbitrary binary watermark messages into a
host video signal, and a decoder that is capable of reproducing the watermark
message embedded in a given watermarked video signal. The robustness of the
digital watermarking scheme will be tested in terms of bit error rate (BER) of
decoded watermark messages when the watermarked video is subjected to the
following attacks:
1. addition of white Gaussian noise,
2. scaling of pixel values by a constant gain factor,
3. random frame deletion,
4. frame rate modification,
5. spatial resizing,
6. frame cropping, and
7. lossy compression.
The second objective of this thesis is to implement a dynamic traitor tracing
scheme that is capable of tracing all members of a group of pirates who carry
out a collusion attack on a watermarked video.
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1.5 Contributions
We propose and evaluate a method of achieving temporal synchronisation in
a digital video watermarking scheme without the use of a template signal.
We show that this method is capable of achieving synchronisation when the
frame rate of the watermarked video is changed, and when individual frames
are randomly deleted. We also propose a modification to the dynamic traitor
tracing scheme of Fiat and Tassa that makes the scheme applicable to dynamic
settings with delayed feedback from pirate rebroadcasts. We show that with
this modification the scheme traces all traitors in less time than the original
scheme.
1.6 Overview
In this thesis we describe the design and implementation of a prototype digital
video watermarking scheme and dynamic traitor tracing scheme. Our designs
are based on existing designs of watermarking and traitor tracing schemes,
which we review in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we describe the designs of our
schemes, and in Chapter 4 we provide details of the implementation of the
designs in software. We test the watermarking scheme by watermarking several
uncompressed digital videos, subjecting the watermarked videos to the attacks
listed in Section 1.4, and determining the BER of the messages decoded from
the attacked videos. We test the traitor tracing scheme by simulating dynamic
settings with pirate rebroadcasts. Details of the tests conducted and their
results can be found in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 we conclude and discuss
possibilities for future work on this topic.
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Literature Review
In this chapter we review the literature on which our designs are based. We
can divide the work into two basic components. The first component is the
digital watermarking scheme that embeds the bits of a given binary message
signal into a host video signal. The second component is the traitor tracing
scheme that generates message signals for each user’s watermarked copy in
a way that makes the entire scheme robust against collusion attacks. Since
these two components are often studied in isolation, we review the literature
associated with each component in separate sections.
2.1 Digital Watermarking
We begin by discussing literature focussed on digital watermarking. We chose
to implement a spatial domain watermarking scheme because of the lower com-
putational requirement, when compared to transform domain watermarking.
This makes spatial domain watermarking more suitable for use where water-
mark encoding may need to be performed on limited hardware such as a TV
set-top box. Therefore, we will not discuss transform domain techniques, such
as those used in [15, 21, 25].
2.1.1 The Uncompressed Digital Video Signal
An uncompressed digital video consists of a sequence of T frames, each of which
is a 2-dimensional pixel array of width X and height Y . Each pixel in a colour
video can be represented by a coordinate vector in a colour space. Examples
of colour spaces are RGB, HSV, and Y ′CbCr [35]. For our implementation we
chose to represent digital videos using the Y ′CbCr colour space. We motivate
this choice in Chapter 4.
The three colour components of Y ′CbCr are the luma (Y ′), blue-difference
(Cb), and red-difference (Cr) components. The luma component describes the
brightness of the pixel, such that a video or image containing only this com-
8
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Y ′ Cb Cr
Figure 2.1: A 4 × 4 pixel video frame represented using the Y ′CbCr colour space
with 4:2:0 chroma subsampling. Each block represents a byte-valued pixel.
ponent would appear to be greyscale or “black-and-white”. The blue-difference
and red-difference components provide additional colour information for each
pixel so that the pixel colour can be reproduced from all three components.
The separation of luma and colour channels provided by the Y ′CbCr rep-
resentation allows video and image compression algorithms to make use of a
technique known as chroma subsampling. Chroma subsampling involves using
a lower spatial resolution for colour information (Cb and Cr channels) than for
brightness information (luma channel) in an image or video. This technique
takes advantage of the fact that the human eye is less sensitive to changes in
colour than to changes in brightness, in order to reduce the space required to
store an image or video [7]. The type of chroma subsampling used by a digital
image or video format is described by a ratio of the form XJ : Xa : Xb, where
XJ is usually equal to 4. For each colour channel, XJ : Xa represents the ratio
of luma pixels to colour pixels for every odd row of the image (video frame),
and XJ : Xb represents the ratio of luma pixels to colour pixels for every even
row of the image (video frame).
Before an image or video is displayed, the subsampled colour channels
are upsampled to the resolution of the brightness channel. The three colour
coordinates corresponding to each pixel are then converted to the RGB primary
values necessary to recreate the correct pixel colour on the display device.
Since the resolution of the displayed image is the same as that of the brightness
channel of the stored image, we refer to the resolution of the brightness channel
when quoting the resolution of an image or video. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
Y ′CbCr representation of a video frame with a height of 4 pixels and a width
of 4 pixels, using 4:2:0 chroma subsampling. Both the height and width of
each colour channel are half those of the brightness channel.
For simplicity, Chapters 2 and 3 describe techniques for digitally water-
marking a single colour channel of the video signal; i.e. each pixel is considered
to be represented by a scalar value. We can then represent a digital video signal
as a function, v[x, y, t], where x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , X−1} and y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Y −1} are
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 10
t = 0 t = T − 1
y = 0
y = Y − 1 x = X − 1
x = 0
Figure 2.2: Digital video represented as a function, v[x, y, t], where x ∈ {0, . . . , X−
1} and y ∈ {0, . . . , Y − 1} are horizontal and vertical pixel coordinates, respectively,
and t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} is the frame number. The shaded region represents the single
pixel value, v[X − 1, Y − 1, 0].
horizontal and vertical pixel coordinates, respectively, and t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T−1}
is the frame number. Since pixel values for a single colour channel are stored
as bytes in a digital video, v[x, y, t] ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 255}. Figure 2.2 illustrates this
representation of a video signal as a function. In Chapter 4 we describe how
we apply the watermarking scheme independently to more than one colour
channel.
2.1.2 Spread Spectrum Watermarking
Spread spectrummodulation is a technique used in telecommunications whereby
a narrowband signal is transmitted using a significantly wider bandwidth than
necessary [36]. The signal power is “spread” over a wide frequency band so
that only a fraction of the total signal power occurs within any narrow sub-
band. The purpose of this may be to make the transmitted signal difficult to
detect in the presence of background noise, or to mitigate the effect of nar-
rowband jamming. Additionally, shared secret keys can be used to modulate
and demodulate spread spectrum signals so that unauthorised receivers and
transmitters cannot communicate with authorised ones [37, 23]. These prop-
erties are analogous to the properties of fidelity, robustness and security that
are desirable for digital watermarks [6]. For this reason, several watermarking
schemes are based on principles of spread-spectrum communication [37, 13, 21].
The spread-spectrum technique most commonly used for digital water-
marking is known as direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS). Figure 2.3 shows
a model of a DSSS communication system. The transmitter generates the
DSSS signal by multiplying the modulated message signal by a spreading chip
signal. The received DSSS signal is multiplied by the same chip signal prior
to demodulation to give the received message. Since it is necessary for the
receiver and transmitter to use the same chip signal, the chip signal is a type
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Figure 2.3: Diagram of a direct sequence spread spectrum communication system.
The message, m, is first modulated using some narrowband modulation technique.
The modulated message signal is then multiplied by a chip signal, s, which spreads
the signal over a wide frequency band before transmission. At the receiver the
spread spectrum signal is multiplied by s and the resulting narrowband signal is
demodulated to give the decoded message signal, mˆ.
of shared secret key necessary for communication. The chip signal is chosen
to be a periodic, binary polar pseudonoise (PN) sequence with a sharp au-
tocorrelation, which helps the receiver to synchronise on the chip signal [36].
Where multiple PN sequences are used for communication across the same
channel, for example in code division multiple access (CDMA) systems [38],
the PN sequences are also chosen to have minimal cross-correlation to reduce
interference [36].
2.1.3 Host-Aware Watermarking Schemes
In some watermarking schemes, including some of those based on spread-
spectrum communication, the message signal, m(u), is encoded into w(u) inde-
pendently of the host signal, v [6]. In such a scheme, the watermarked signal
v(u) is the sum of a watermark signal, w(u), which can be decoded to give mˆ,
and the host signal, v, which is of value to a human user, but carries no useful
information for the decoder. If blind decoding is used, the decoder cannot
simply subtract v from p(u) to find (a possibly distorted version of) w(u). In
this setting, the host signal is itself a source of channel noise for the watermark
signal, reducing the amount of information that can be communicated reliably
within the watermark [39].
Another approach is to encode m(u) into w(u) in a way that is dependent
on v. The scheme in Figure 1.1 on page 3 is of this type, which is sometimes
referred to as a host-aware scheme. In a host-aware scheme it is possible for
the encoder to determine how to distribute the watermarking distortion over
v(u) so that the maximum watermarking strength can be used without causing
noticeable degradation to the host signal. This can be achieved by using some
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type of perceptual model, which models how sensitive human senses are to
signal distortions in particular parts of the host signal [40]. Once the optimal
distribution of distortion is determined, it can be used to scale the strength
of w(u) locally in order to maximise the robustness of the watermark, while
ensuring high fidelity of the watermarked signal.
2.1.4 Communication with Side Information
In a host-aware scheme, prior to encoding w(u), the encoder knows exactly
what “noise” signal (the host signal, v) will be added to w(u) to produce v(u).
This prior information about the effect of the transmission channel is known
as side information [41]. Communication systems where side information is
available to the transmitter were first studied by Shannon in [42]. Shannon
showed that if the encoder has access to side information, then it can encode
m(u) in such a way that the encoded signal, when added to the known channel
noise, yields a signal from which the decoder will correctly produce m(u).
In [43] Costa proved that, for a noisy channel with a power-constrained
transmitter, the capacity of a standard Gaussian channel can be achieved with
blind decoding and side information at the transmitter. In order to achieve
this capacity, a common codebook must be used for encoding and decoding.
The optimal codebook should be constructed so that for each possible state of
the side information signal, there exist codewords that are close enough to that
state that the transmitter power constraint is obeyed, yet far enough apart to
be distinguishable by the decoder.
In [39] Chen and Wornell proposed methods for generating suitable code-
books for digital watermarking where each codeword is a differently quantised
version of the host signal. The quantised versions of the host signal are close
enough to the original host signal that the power of the watermark signal is
constrained, and the decoder can distinguish codewords by finding the nearest
quantised version of the received video signal. Their technique is therefore
known as quantisation index modulation (QIM).
2.1.5 Dither Modulation
One of the QIM techniques presented in [39] generates v(u) by adding to v
a dither signal corresponding to m(u), before quantising v. This technique is
referred to as dither modulation (DM). Here we describe the simplest type of
DM encoding and decoding, where a single message bit, b, is encoded in the
scalar host, z, using a scalar quantiser. Multi-bit messages can be encoded
into video signals by partitioning the host video signal into individual scalar
values and applying the DM technique to each of these values.
A scalar quantiser, q, maps a value, z, to the nearest point in a set of
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∆
b = 0
b = 1
b = 0
b = 1
qDM (z, 0,∆)
dDM (1,∆) = ∆/4
z
qDM (z, 1,∆)
Figure 2.4: Illustration of dither modulation of the scalar host signal z, using a
quantiser step size of ∆, and dDM(1,∆) = ∆/4. A binary ‘1’ is encoded into z
by generating qDM(z, 1,∆), and a ‘0’ is encoded by generating qDM(z, 0,∆). The
maximum possible change induced in the host by DM encoding is ∆/2, which occurs
when the value of z corresponds perfectly to a DM encoded bit, b, and the binary
compliment of b must be encoded into z.
discrete points, such that
q(z,∆) = round(z/∆)∆, (2.1.1)
where ∆ is the step size of the quantiser, and round(·) is the function of
rounding to the nearest integer. This quantiser can be used in conjunction
with a dither signal to embed a bit, b ∈ {0, 1}, in the scalar host signal, z, to
give
qDM(z, b,∆) = q [z + dDM(b,∆),∆]− dDM(b,∆), (2.1.2)
where dDM(b,∆) is a dither value corresponding to the bit, b, chosen such that
dDM(1,∆) =
{
dDM(0,∆) + ∆/2, dDM(0,∆) < 0
dDM(0,∆)−∆/2, dDM(0,∆) ≥ 0 . (2.1.3)
In our implementation, we simply choose dDM(0,∆) = −∆/4 and dDM(1,∆) =
+∆/4. Figure 2.4 illustrates how a scalar host signal, z, can be dither modu-
lated to embed either b = 0 or b = 1. It can be seen from the figure that the
maximum distance between any host signal, z, and the DM value that encodes
b is ∆/2, which occurs when z is exactly the DM value that encodes the binary
compliment of b. This property results in an upper bound on the amount of
watermark signal power required to encode any watermark message into any
host signal.
Let nch be a scalar value representing the channel noise and let p =
qDM(z, b,∆) + nch be the noisy signal received by the DM decoder. The esti-
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mated message bit, bˆ, decoded from p, is given by
bˆ = arg min
b′∈{0,1}
|y − qDM(p, b′,∆)| , (2.1.4)
where q, ∆, and dDM are the same as those used by the encoder. The decoder
will not make an error as long as the magnitude of the channel noise is less
than ∆/4. In fact, correct decoding occurs when 2k∆ −∆/4 < nch < 2k∆ +
∆/4∀k ∈ Z. However it is impractical to rely on the event where k 6= 0.
2.1.6 Spread-Transform Dither Modulation
An extension of DM is introduced in [39] where the host signal is first trans-
formed by projection before encoding and decoding. This technique is referred
to as spread-transform dither modulation (STDM). Figure 2.5 illustrates the
STDM encoding procedure. Again, we describe a simple case where only a
single-bit watermark message is used. Therefore only two watermarked ver-
sions of v, v(0), and v(1) are generated, and assigned to users, u0 and u1,
respectively. The encoding and decoding procedures can simply be repeated
on different parts of a video signal to embed multi-bit messages.
The first step of the encoding procedure is to project the host signal, v,
onto a pseudo-noise chip signal, s. The projection function, fp, produces a
scaled magnitude of this projection, and is given by
fp(v[x, y, t], s[x, y, t]) =
X−1∑
x=0
Y−1∑
y=0
T−1∑
t=0
s[x, y, t]v[x, y, t]. (2.1.5)
The nearest value to fp(v, s) that encodes a bit, b, is determined by applying
the scalar DM encoding function in (2.1.2) to fp(v, s) to give
qSTDM(v, b,∆, s) = qDM [fp(v, s), b,∆] . (2.1.6)
The encoder then calculates the watermark signal, w(b), corresponding to b,
which is the smallest signal satisfying fp(v + w, s) = qSTDM(v, b,∆, s). This
watermark signal is given by
w(b)[x, y, t] =
s
weight(s)
[qSTDM(v, b,∆, s)− fp(v, s)] , (2.1.7)
where
weight(s) =
X−1∑
x=0
Y−1∑
y=0
T−1∑
t=0
s[x, y, t]. (2.1.8)
The watermark signal is added to the original host signal to give the water-
marked signal,
v(b)[x, y, t] = v[x, y, t] + w(b)[x, y, t]. (2.1.9)
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b = 0
b = 1
b = 0
b = 1
qSTDM (v, 0,∆, s)
dDM (1,∆) = ∆/4
fp(v, s)
qSTDM (v, 1,∆, s)
v s
w(1)
v(1)
Figure 2.5: Illustration of spread-transform dither modulation of the host signal,
v, using a quantiser step size of ∆, and dDM(1,∆) = ∆/4. The host signal, v, chip
signal, s, watermark signal, w(1), and watermarked signal, v(1), are represented here
as vectors. The encoder first determines the scalar projection of v onto s using the
projection function, fp. The encoder then adds w(1) to v to give v(1), such that the
(scalar) projection of v(1) onto s is equal to qSTDM(v, 1,∆, s).
Let p(b) = v(b) + n be the noisy watermarked signal received by the decoder.
The decoder determines an estimate, bˆ, of the received message bit as shown
in Figure 2.6, by first applying the projection function, fp, to p(b), using the
same chip signal, s, and then applying the DM decoding rule to the resulting
magnitude, which gives
bˆ = arg min
b′∈{0,1}
∣∣fp(p(b), s)− qSTDM(p(b), b′,∆, s)∣∣ . (2.1.10)
The use of a pseudo-noise chip signal has two advantages, which are similar
to the advantages provided by spread spectrum techniques. Firstly, it allows
large quantisation step sizes to be applied to the projected host signal while
only low-amplitude distortions are induced in the watermarked signal [39].
Secondly, when noise is added to the watermarked signal, it is the magnitude
projection of that noise onto the chip signal that affects the determination of
the bit value at the decoder [39]. Therefore, noise added to the watermarked
signal by an attacker has a large effect on decoder errors when the magnitude of
its projection onto s is large, but a small effect when that magnitude is small.
This property is illustrated in Figure 2.6. If s is kept secret then the attacker
wishing to defeat the watermarking scheme by adding noise must either try
to guess s (which may be infeasible) or simply add a high level of noise power
to try and increase the chance of decoder errors. The latter option is likely to
severely degrade the pirate copy.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 16
∆
∆
b = 0
b = 1
b = 0
b = 1
dDM (1,∆) = ∆/4
fp(v1 + nopt, s)
qSTDM(v1 + nopt, 1,∆, s)
s
v(1)
b = 0
nopt
qSTDM(v1 + nopt, 0,∆, s)
ng
Figure 2.6: Illustration of the effect of an added noise signal on STDM decoding.
The chip signal, s, watermarked signal, v(1), and noise signals, nopt and ng are rep-
resented as vectors. The watermarked signal encodes the bit, b = 1. This bit is cor-
rectly decoded when fp(v(1), s) is closer to qSTDM(v, 1,∆, s) than to qSTDM(v, 0,∆, s).
The smallest noise signal required to induce a decoding error is nopt. Since deter-
mining nopt requires knowledge of the secret chip signal, s, the pirate adds a random
noise signal, ng. This signal needs to be much larger than nopt in order to induce
decoder errors.
∆
2
z
Figure 2.7: Sample histogram of the dither modulated values in v(u), using a
quantiser step size of ∆. For each possible scalar value, z, q(z,∆) is an integer
multiple of ∆, and since qDM(z, 0,∆) and qDM(z, 1,∆) differ by ∆/2, the possible
dither modulated values in v(u) are separated by exactly ∆/2.
2.1.7 Gain Attacks
A watermarked signal may be subjected to amplitude scaling. In video wa-
termarking, this can result from brightness or colour adjustments, or from in-
tentional attacks by pirates on embedded watermarks. We refer to amplitude
scaling as a gain attack. Some watermarking schemes, especially those based
on additive spread spectrum and transform domain techniques, are inherently
robust against this form of attack [15, 21]. QIM watermarking schemes, on
the other hand, are particularly vulnerable to gain attacks [12, 44].
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Figure 2.8: Sample histogram of the dither modulated values in αv(u). Since v(u)
has been perfectly scaled by the gain factor, α, the dither modulated scalar values
it contains are now separated by α∆/2.
We can see why this is so by considering a DM scheme where a long binary
message, m(u), is encoded into the host signal, v, using a quantiser with step
size ∆, to generate the watermarked signal, v(u). If we construct a histogram
of the dither modulated scalar values in v(u) it would look similar to the one
in Figure 2.7. Let v(u) be subjected to a gain attack that multiplies v(u) by a
constant gain, α, producing the signal, αv(u). This new signal is equivalent to
the dither modulated signal that would be generated if m(u) were embedded
in the host signal, αv, using a quantiser step size of α∆. The histogram of
the dither modulated values in αv(u) would be similar to those in Figure 2.8.
The encoder step size, ∆, is known to the decoder and used in the decoding
algorithm. The mismatch between the quantisation step size of αv(u), α∆, and
the step size used by the decoder, ∆, results in decoding errors [12].
In [12] Pérez et al. proposed a technique known as rational dither modu-
lation where the DM encoding procedure is applied to a rational function of
the host signal, which is invariant to constant amplitude scaling. The decoder
applies the same rational function to the received watermarked signal before
applying the DM decoding algorithm. A drawback to this method is that the
rational function is not invariant under additive noise. This can cause the
decoder-calculated value of the rational function to differ from the encoder-
calculated value, resulting in decoding errors.
Another approach to improving the robustness of DM against gain attacks
is to let the decoder estimate the gain applied to the watermarked signal and
scale the quantisation step size used for decoding accordingly. By observing
a histogram of the dither modulated values in p(u), the decoder can estimate
α∆. This is trivial in the case where p(u) = α∆, and the histogram is similar
to the one in Figure 2.8. However, estimating α∆ can be more difficult when
p(u) = αv(u) + n, where n is an added noise signal that causes deviation from
the perfectly dither modulated values. If n is Gaussian then the noisy dither
modulated values become Gaussian distributions around their corresponding
perfectly dither modulated means and the histogram may look more like the
one in Figure 2.9 [44]. Noting that this distribution appears roughly sinu-
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 18
α∆
2
z
Figure 2.9: Sample histogram of the dither modulated values in p(u) = αv(u) + n,
where n is a Gaussian noise signal. The scalar values in p(u), from which the de-
coder must decode watermark message bits, are now distributed around the perfectly
encoded values in αv(u). This makes estimation of α more difficult than when no
noise is added to αv(u). If the noise is small enough compared to ∆, the histogram
should still contain peaks at intervals of α∆/2. Since the peaks and troughs of the
histogram give it a roughly sinusoidal form, the decoder can use the discrete Fourier
transform to determine the period of the peaks, and determine α.
soidal, Eggers et al. presented a technique in [44] whereby the fundamental
period of the histogram of the dither modulated values of p(u) is determined
using the discrete Fourier transform. The fundamental period is then used to
calculate α∆. In [44] the encoder adds a template signal to the host, which is
used specifically for gain estimation. In [45] a similar Fourier transform-based
approach is used, but without the need for a template signal.
2.2 Traitor Tracing
We now turn our attention to collusion attacks, and methods that have been
developed to make digital watermarking schemes robust against these at-
tacks. In this thesis we only consider a single set of collaborating pirates,
each of whom have access to content distributed by the CP. The traitor trac-
ing schemes described here can simply be repeated for each disjoint set of
collaborating pirates responsible for a particular pirate redistribution.
2.2.1 Collusion Attacks
Let U be the set of users of the CP, where |U | = Nu, and let m(ui) be the
watermark message assigned to user ui ∈ U , where i ∈ {1, . . . , Nu}. Let
C ⊂ U be the set of Nc collaborating pirates, and let VC be the set of Nc
watermarked video copies to which the pirates in C have access.
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2.2.1.1 Averaging Attack
Let p(C) be the pirate copy produced by a collusion attack carried out by C. A
simple way in which the pirates in C may attempt to corrupt the watermark
signals embedded in their copies is to generate p(C) by “averaging out” their
copies so that
p(C)[x, y, t] =
∑
v∈VC v[x, y, t]
Nc
. (2.2.1)
This process is intended to cause interference between the watermark signals,
which are unique to each copy, and may, for some watermarking schemes,
result in a copy that is more similar to the original host signal than either of
the watermarked copies. An advantage of this attack is that it can be carried
out with no knowledge of the watermarking scheme.
The problem of successfully communicating watermark messages under this
form of collusion attack is analogous to the problem of channel multi-access
in telecommunication systems. Techniques like code division multiple access
(CDMA) and orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) are used
in telecommunications systems to allow multiple users to communicate on the
same channel at the same time while the interference between their signals is
minimal [36, 38]. For this reason these techniques have been applied to some
watermarking schemes in order to provide robustness against the averaging
attack [29].
2.2.1.2 Bit Selection Attack
Another collusion strategy is to identically partition each video in VC into
parts, and choose a part from one of the videos to be the corresponding part
of p(C). The parts may simply be individual frames. However, if the wa-
termarking scheme embeds individual bits across multiple frames, this may
not be sufficient to prevent the decoder from correctly decoding a watermark
message incriminating a member of C. The pirates may therefore attempt to
identify the parts of each video in which individual bits of m(u) are encoded,
and construct p(C) from these parts. The pirates in C may use any strategy
for selecting which video contributes each part (encoded message bit) to p(C).
Possible strategies include uniform random selection from VC , or majority se-
lection, where the most commonly occurring version of each part is selected.
Let us assume that the underlying watermark modulation scheme embeds
the bits of m(u) in such a way that there is negligible probability that a pi-
rate in possession of a single watermarked copy can deduce the part of the
watermarked copy in which each bit of the watermark message is encoded.
Let us assume further that a group of collaborating pirates in possession of
multiple watermarked copies can only identify a part corresponding to a par-
ticular bit of m(u) by finding a part that occurs as an encoded ‘1’, and as an
encoded ‘0’ among their differently watermarked copies. The parts that do
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not differ between copies correspond to bits that are common to each water-
mark message, and are undetectable by the pirates. The assumption we make
here was introduced in [27] and is referred to as the marking assumption. The
collusion-secure codes described in this thesis rely on this assumption.
Where bits are undetectable, the pirates must use the only available version
of that part to produce p(C). Where the pirates can detect a part corresponding
to a particular bit, they may choose to use either the ‘1’ or ‘0’ state of that bit
available to them to produce that part of p(C). The pirates may also choose to
concentrate other attacks, for example, addition of noise, on the parts found
to encode individual bits in order to destroy those bits. We denote a destroyed
bit, which the decoder cannot decode into a valid bit, as b?. Let m(C) be the
corrupted watermarked message present in the collusion-attacked pirate copy.
The jth bit of m(C) is given by
m
(C)
j ∈
{ {0, 1, b?}, if detectable
{m(u1)j }, otherwise.
(2.2.2)
If the marking assumption holds, then any bit position, j, where m(C)j = b?
reveals to the CP that the pirates in C had access to both the ‘1’ and ‘0’ version
of that bit encoded in their copies. Since this gives the CP more information
about the watermarked copies used by the pirates than when m(C)j = 1 or
m
(C)
j = 0, producing invalid bits is a poor pirate strategy. In [27] invalid bits
in m(C) are replaced arbitrarily with ‘0’s. In this thesis we take the same
approach so we will no longer consider invalid bits as a special case.
The averaging attack described in the previous section can be regarded as a
special case of the bit selection attack. To see why this is so, consider a simpli-
fied video watermarking scheme where the value of the pixel at position x = x0,
y = y0, and t = t0 encodes the watermark message bit, m
(u)
j . Let v[x0, y0, t0] =
λ1 encode a ‘1’, and let v[x0, y0, t0] = λ0 6= λ1 encode a ‘0’. Suppose two pi-
rates, u1 and u2, carry out an averaging attack. If, m
(u1)
j = m
(u2)
j = 1, then,
according to (2.2.1), p(C)[x0, y0, t0] = λ1, which encodes m
(C)
j = 1. Similarly,
if m(u1)j = m
(u2)
j = 0, then p(C)[x0, y0, t0] = λ0, which encodes m
(C)
j = 0.
However, if m(u1)j 6= m(u2)j , then p(C)[x0, y0, t0] = (λ1 + λ0)/2, which does not
encode a valid bit. This is the same as the marking assumption since only
detectable bits can be destroyed by averaging. Therefore, when dealing with
collusion attacks, we will only consider bit selection attacks.
To see why the bit selection attack is problematic, consider the following
example given in [27]. Let C = {u1, u2, u3} be a set of three users who collude
to produce the pirate copy, p(C). Let v(u1), v(u2), and v(u3) be the uniquely
watermarked videos distributed to u1, u2, and u3, respectively, and let m(u1),
m(u2), and m(u3) be the unique watermark codewords encoded into v(u1), v(u2),
and v(u3), respectively. Now suppose the pirates in C carry out a bit selection
attack by selecting for each bit, m(C)j , in m(C), the corresponding bit found to
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p(C)
VC
m(u2) =
[
0 1 0 1
]
1
0
1 00
0 1
1 1
01
1
0 0
1
0
m(u1) =
[
1 0 0 0
]
m(u3) =
[
1 1 1 0
]
m(C) =
[
1 1 0 0
]
v(u1) v(u2) v(u3)
Figure 2.10: Illustration of the bit selection collusion attack. The large multi-
coloured rectangles represent a frame taken from each video (at the same frame
position) in the available set of copies, VC . The small coloured regions represent
parts of the frame that contain a watermark signal that encodes the bit displayed in
that region. The encoded watermark messages are shown below the frames. The pi-
rates generate the corresponding frame of the pirate copy, p(C), by selecting the part
of each frame found to be most common among their copies. Since the bottom-left
part is common to all of their copies, the pirates can only use this part for p(C). The
resulting frame in p(C) could have been generated using any pair of watermarked
frames, which means that no single watermarked copy can be said with certainty to
have contributed to p(C).
occur in at least two out of the three copies available to them. That is,
m
(C)
j ∈
{
m
(u1)
j , if m
(u1)
j = m
(u2)
j or m
(u1)
j = m
(u3)
j
m
(u2)
j , if m
(u2)
j = m
(u3)
j
. (2.2.3)
An illustration of this bit selection attack is shown in Figure 2.10. When
the CP receives p(C), which is watermarked with m(C), it cannot be certain
that the majority strategy was actually used by the pirates. Additionally, it
is possible for a group of pirates with access to any two of the three possible
messages to have selected every bit of m(C) from one of those two messages.
Therefore, the CP cannot tell whether {u1, u2}, {u1, u2}, or {u1, u2} created
the pirate copy. Since no user is common to all of these possible pairs, no user
can be incriminated with any certainty.
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2.2.2 Collusion-Secure Codes
Collusion-secure binary watermarking codes were introduced by Boneh and
Shaw in [27], as a solution to the bit selection collusion attack problem. They
proposed a static traitor tracing scheme in which each user in U receives a
copy watermarked with a unique collusion-secure codeword, constructed in
such a way that a pirate copy resulting from a collusion attack carried out
by C can be traced with some certainty to at least one member of C. Let
M = {(m(u1), u1), (m(u2), u2) . . . (m(uNu ), uNu)} be the set of ordered pairs of
collusion-secure codewords (watermark messages) and the users who receive
copies watermarked with those codewords. Upon finding a collusion-attacked
copy, the CP decodes the corrupted watermark message and passes it to a
function fincr that incriminates some subset of users Cˆ as having contributed
to the collusion-attacked copy, where
Cˆ = fincr(m
(C),M). (2.2.4)
The incrimination function is probabilistic, i.e. the users in Cˆ are believed to
be pirates with some probability of error, since a deterministic static traitor
tracing scheme would require impractically long codes [27]. In [46] Laarhoven
et al. describe the performance of a collusion-secure code construction in terms
of its soundness and completeness, and we use similar definitions in this thesis.
A collusion-secure code is 1-sound if the probability of accusing an innocent
user of being one of the pirate collaborators is, at most, 1. That is,
P (Cˆ ∩ (U \ C) 6= ∅) ≤ 1. (2.2.5)
A collusion-secure code is 2-complete if the probability of not accusing any
member of C is, at most, 2. That is,
P (Cˆ ∩ C = ∅) ≤ 2. (2.2.6)
The construction of Boneh and Shaw requires a watermark message length of
l = O(Nˆc
3
ln(Nu/2)) (2.2.7)
bits for 2 completeness, where Nˆc ≤ Nu is an upper bound on the number
of pirates in C. If Nc > Nˆc then the scheme is no longer provably sound or
complete.
2.2.3 The Codeword Construction of Tardos
In [17] Tardos introduced another construction of 1-secure, 2-complete binary
collusion-secure codes for static traitor tracing, which requires a watermark
message length of
l = O(Nˆc
2
ln(Nu/1)) (2.2.8)
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bits, where
2 = 
Nˆc/4
1 . (2.2.9)
As with the scheme of Boneh and Shaw, Nˆc is an upper bound on the number
of pirates in C. Tardos proved this message length to be optimal, within
a constant factor, for these parameters. We describe the construction and
incrimination algorithms below for Nˆc > 2. The values of the constants that
appear in the construction were selected in [17] to be dl = 100, dδ = 300, and
dτ = 20.
1. Set the codeword length l = dlNˆc
2
ln(Nu/1).
2. For each bit position, j, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, select ρ′j independently randomly from
a uniform distribution over [δ, pi
2
− δ], where δ is the cut-off parameter,
given by
δ = arcsin
√
1/dδNc. (2.2.10)
3. Set m(ui)j = 1 with probability ρj = sin
2ρ′j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nu
and encode m(ui) into the copy transmitted to ui.
4. When pirate content containing the corrupted watermark message,m(C),
is received, calculate an incrimination score for each user ui ∈ U , using
the score function,
sincr(ui,m
(C)) =
l∑
j=1
Sij, (2.2.11)
where S is a score matrix constructed as follows:
Sij =
{
+
√
(1− ρj)/ρj, if m(ui)j = 1 and m(C)j = 1
−√ρj/(1− ρj), if m(ui)j = 0 and m(C)j = 1 (2.2.12)
If for any user ui ∈ U , sincr(ui,m(C)) > τ , where τ is a score threshold
given by
τ = dτ ln(Nu/1), (2.2.13)
then incriminate ui as a pirate.
2.2.4 Improvements to Tardos’ Codes
In [47], Škorić et al. improved the performance of Tardos’ codes by using a
modified, symmetric score matrix. The code construction remains the same as
above, except that in step 4 the incrimination score function, sincr, is replaced
by the new symmetric incrimination score function, s′incr, given by
s′incr(ui,m
(C)) =
l∑
1
S′ij, (2.2.14)
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 24
where the symmetric score matrix, S′, is constructed as follows:
S′ij =

+
√
(1− ρj)/ρj, if m(ui)j = 1 and m(C)j = 1
−√ρj/(1− ρj), if m(ui)j = 0 and m(C)j = 1
−√(1− ρj)/ρj, if m(ui)j = 1 and m(C)j = 0
+
√
ρj/(1− ρj), if m(ui)j = 0 and m(C)j = 0 .
(2.2.15)
The user ui ∈ U is then incriminated if s′incr(ui,m(C)) > τ .
In [46] a constant-factor improvement was made to the length of Tardos’
original codes by using the symmetric score matrix above, selecting dl = 23.79,
dδ = 28.31, and dτ = 8.06, and rounding the resulting code length up to the
nearest integer.
2.2.5 Dynamic Tardos Codes
In [16], Laarhoven et al. modified Tardos’ code construction to work as a
dynamic traitor tracing scheme where the bits of each user’s codeword are
generated on the fly. In this dynamic version of the scheme, the incrimination
score of each user is updated as each bit of the watermark message encoded in
a pirate redistribution is received. When a user’s incrimination score exceeds
the threshold value for any value of Nˆc then that user is incriminated and
disconnected. Their scheme was also shown to work when feedback from the
pirate redistribution is delayed. Laarhoven et al. also presented a method
in [16] by which optimal message lengths can be obtained for their dynamic
scheme, while ensuring 1-soundness and 2-completeness for a total number
of Nˆu users, and a maximum number of Nˆc collaborating pirates.
We describe the optimisation method here. For this optimisation, define γ
as
γ = 1 +
ln(2)
ln(Nˆu)− ln(1)
. (2.2.16)
Now let g(λ) : (1
2
,∞)→ (0,∞) be a function whose inverse, g−1(φ), is defined
as
g−1(φ) =
eφ − 1− φ
φ2
. (2.2.17)
Since the Tardos codeword length, l, is given by l = dlNˆc
2
ln(Nu/1), for a given
Nˆc, Nu, and 1, the optimal codeword length can be found by minimising dl.
In [16] this is done by finding parameters φ1 ∈ (12 ,∞), φ2 ∈ (0,∞), and
φ3 ∈ (0, 2pi ) that minimise
dl =
η′
√
dδ
s2c
+ dτ
φ3
, (2.2.18)
where
η′ =
φ2 + ln(2/2)
ln(Nˆu/1)
, (2.2.19)
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dδ =
[
1
4/pi − 2φ3
(√
[g−1(φ2)φ2]2√
c
+
16
pi
(
2
pi
− φ3
)
+
g−1(φ2)φ2√
c
)]2
,
(2.2.20)
dα = max
 √dδ
g(φ1)
√
Nˆc
,
φ1
φ3
+
√√√√(φ1
φ3
)2
φ1η′
φ3γ
√
dδ
φ22Nˆc
 , (2.2.21)
and
dτ =
φ3d
2
αγ + φ1η
′
√
dδ
φ22Nˆc
φ3dα − φ1 . (2.2.22)
Let dl(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2), dδ(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2), and dτ (Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2) denote the values
of the parameters dl, dt, and dτ , respectively, that solve the above optimisa-
tion for Nˆc collaborating pirates, Nˆu users, 1-soundness, and 2-completeness.
Then, for the dynamic Tardos scheme, let
l(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2) = dl(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2)Nˆc
2
ln(Nˆu/1) (2.2.23)
be the optimal code length,
δ(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2) = arcsin
√
1
dδ(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2)Nˆc
4/3
(2.2.24)
be the optimal cut-off parameter, and
τ(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2) = dτ (Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2)Nˆcln(Nˆu/1) (2.2.25)
be the optimal incrimination score threshold for Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, and 2. The
algorithm for the dynamic scheme of Laarhoven et al. is then as follows:
1. For each bit position j, 1 ≤ j ≤ l(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2), select ρ′j independently
randomly from a uniform distribution over [δmin, pi2 − δmin], where δmin =
δ( ˆNcmax , Nˆu, 1, 2).
2. For c ∈ {1, . . . , Nˆc} let p(c) be a vector whose jth element is given by
p(c)j =
{
1, if δ(c, Nˆu, 1, 2) ≤ ρ′j ≤ pi2 − δ(c, Nˆu, 1, 2)
0, otherwise.
(2.2.26)
3. Setm(ui)j = 1 with probability ρj = sin
2ρ′j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l(Nˆc, Nˆu, 1, 2),
1 ≤ i ≤ Nˆu and encode m(ui)j into the copy transmitted to user ui.
4. As new pirate content is received, decode the watermark message bits
contained in the content. Let m(C) be the total watermark message
received so far, and let l′ be the current number of bits inm(C). Construct
the score matrix S′ from m(C), using (2.2.15).
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5. For each user, ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nu, and for all c ∈ {1, . . . , Nˆc} apply the
dynamic incrimination score function, sdyn, to m(C), where
sdyn(ui, c,m
(C)) =
l′∑
1
S′ijp(c)j, (2.2.27)
and incriminate ui if sdyn(ui, c,m(C)) > τ(c, Nˆu, 1, 2). As soon as a user
is incriminated, disconnect that user and continue with the scheme.
In [16] it is shown that by setting δmin = 0, and letting Nˆc → ∞, the above
scheme can be used to trace a group of collaborating pirates of arbitrary size.
As soon as, for any value of c, sdyn(ui, c,m(C)) > τ(c, Nˆu, 1, 2), the user ui
is disconnected by the CP from the media distribution system. In this way,
all the members of C are eventually disconnected and pirate redistribution is
stopped. This dynamic scheme has some appealing properties, such as the
lowest watermark message length currently found in literature, the ability to
tolerate delayed feedback from the pirate redistribution, and the ability to
trace any number of pirates without the need for an initial upper bound on
Nc.
The dynamic scheme of Laarhoven et al. assigns a unique watermark mes-
sage to each user in U . While this is not a problem for internet-based media
distribution, where the server can send customised information to each client,
it can be a problem for broadcast systems. In broadcast systems, data intended
for any user or set of users is broadcast to all users, and some form of broadcast
encryption is used to control which users can access which information [48]. In
such a setting it may be advantageous to limit the amount of user-specific data
that needs to be transmitted, since each unique message adds to the overall
transmission bandwidth required. In the following section we describe a dy-
namic traitor tracing scheme that partitions U into subsets of users, and the
users in each subset are always assigned the same watermark message signal.
When Nc  Nu, the number of subsets required is much smaller than Nu, and
so is the number of unique watermark messages required.
2.2.6 Fiat and Tassa Dynamic Scheme
The second dynamic traitor tracing scheme presented in [18] by Fiat and Tassa
requires no initial upper bound on Nc, and can trace all pirates in C for any
Nc. When this scheme is applied to a video broadcast, the video broadcast is
partitioned, in time, into contiguous video segments. During each iteration of
the traitor tracing scheme, prior to transmission of the current video segment,
U is partitioned into 2Nd+1 disjoint subsets of users, such that Uc =
⋃
Q∈PFT Q,
where PFT = {L1, R1, . . . , LNd , RNd , I}, and Nd ≤ Nc is the number of pirates
detected by the scheme. Each union, Lk∪Rk, 1 ≤ k ≤ Nd, is known to contain
at least one pirate, and the set I does not contain any detected pirates.
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Each set of users in PFT receives a differently watermarked variant of the
current video segment. The CP monitors any pirate rebroadcasts of its content,
and when a watermarked variant is received, the CP knows that there must
be at least one pirate in the set of users to whom that particular variant was
transmitted. The scheme traces each pirate by successively halving the set of
users containing that pirate until a variant corresponding to a singleton set is
received, and the pirate in that set is disconnected from the broadcast. We
describe the Fiat and Tassa (FT) dynamic traitor tracing scheme below.
1. Set Nd = 0, I = U , and PFT = {I}.
2. Transmit segment variant v(Q) to every user in the non-empty set Q ∈
PFT.
3. Receive segment v(P ) from a pirate redistribution.
4. If v(P ) = v(I), set Nd ← Nd + 1, split I into two sets, LNd and RNd , such
that ||LNd| − |RNd|| ≤ 1, and set PFT ← PFT ∪ {LNd , RNd} and I ← ∅.
5. If v(P ) = v(Lk), 1 ≤ k ≤ Nd, let Q = Lk and Q′ = Rk. If v = v(Rk), 1 ≤
k ≤ Nd, let Q = Rk and Q′ = Lk.
6. Add Q′ to I.
7. If |Q| = 1 disconnect the pirate in Q, set PFT ← PFT \{Q,Q′}, set Nd ←
Nd−1, and renumber the sets in PFT so that PFT = {L1, R1, . . . , LNd , RNd , I}.
Otherwise split Q into two sets, Q and Q′, such that ||Q| − |Q′|| ≤ 1.
8. Repeat steps 2 – 7 forever.
Fiat and Tassa showed that the maximum number of unique variants re-
quired by this scheme is 2Nc+1. They also showed that the maximum number
of iterations (repetitions of steps 2 – 7) required until all Nc pirates are dis-
connected is Nc log2(Nu). However, this is only valid for a scheme where it
is always possible to correctly identify every received segment variant. When
digital watermarks containing probabilistic collusion-secure codes are used to
generate the unique variants, there is always a chance that when a collusion-
attacked pirate segment is received, it will be determined in error to have been
created using some original variant. This will result in the generation of an-
other branch of the search tree that attempts to trace a non-existent pirate.
This non-existent pirate increases the requirements of the scheme.
In [28] Tassa used the collusion-secure binary watermarking code construc-
tion of Boneh and Shaw [27] to mark the segment variants transmitted in the
above algorithm. It is suggested in [28] that using instead the construction
of Tardos [17], the codeword length of which is a factor O(Nc) smaller than
than that of the construction in [27], will reduce the overall bandwidth require-
ments of the scheme. This is done by carrying out the codeword construction
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Figure 2.11: Illustration of the effect of delayed feedback from a pirate rebroadcast
on the dynamic scheme of Fiat and Tassa when binary watermarks are used to
produce video segment variants. The first transmitted video segment contains the
watermark message b1–b4. The pirate version of the first segment is received by
the CP tdelay seconds after that segment was transmitted by the CP. Since the
distribution of the variants of the second segment (containing bits b5–b8) depends on
the watermark found in the first segment, the CP transmits non-watermarked video
while it waits for the first segment. At the rate at which the watermarking scheme
encodes message bits, this waiting period wastes the equivalent of 2 message bits.
procedure described in Section 2.2.3 immediately before each iteration, us-
ing Nˆc = Nu = 2Nd + 1 for some desired 1 and 2. The resulting 2Nd + 1
codewords are then used as the watermark messages encoded into each video
segment variant. When a pirate segment is received, the incrimination score
function is used to identify, with certainty, which of the originally transmitted
variants were used to construct the pirate segment.
2.2.7 Delayed Feedback from Pirate Rebroadcast
In the FT scheme, the variants of each video segment are only assigned to sets
of users once the previously transmitted pirate segment is received by the CP.
This is acceptable if the pirate content is rebroadcast simultaneously with the
original broadcast. However, if there is a delay between transmitting a segment
and receiving the pirated version of that segment, then the traitor tracing
scheme must wait for the received segment before updating P . Since the
video broadcast must be continuous, this means that either non-watermarked
content, or content watermarked with redundant information would have to be
broadcast while the traitor tracing scheme waits for feedback from the pirate
rebroadcast.
We assume that the digital watermarking scheme embeds watermark mes-
sages into the video segments at a constant rate of rwm bits per second of
video broadcast. We also assume that the pirate rebroadcast is delayed by a
constant tdelay seconds, with respect to the original broadcast, and that the
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CP has access to the delayed pirate rebroadcast. The number of watermark
message bits, bdelay, that can be transmitted during tdelay is then given by
bdelay = rwmtdelay. For the FT scheme, using Tardos codes to mark the seg-
ment variants, the equivalent of bdelay bits of digital watermark bits are wasted
during every iteration while the scheme waits for feedback. Figure 2.11 illus-
trates this effect.
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System Design
We will now describe how we apply the techniques reviewed in the previous
chapter to the design of a digital video watermarking scheme with dynamic
traitor tracing. We begin by describing the design of a digital watermarking
algorithm for encoding arbitrary binary messages into uncompressed digital
video. We then go on to describe the dynamic traitor tracing scheme used to
construct the watermark message signals assigned to each user in such a way
that the entire watermarking scheme is robust against collusion attacks.
3.1 The Watermarking Scheme
The digital video watermark modulation scheme presented here consists of an
encoder and decoder, as shown in Figure 1.1 on page 3. Our implementation
is based on the STDM technique, introduced by Chen and Wornell [39], and
described in Section 2.1.6 on page 14. This section describes the algorithms
implemented by the encoder and decoder.
3.1.1 Video Blocks
Prior to watermark encoding or decoding, the video signal is partitioned along
the time axis into K contiguous blocks, each consisting of Tb frames, where
K = bT/Tbc. We call this partitioning function fb. The kth block of a video
v[x, y, t] is given by
fb (v[x, y, t], k) = v[x, y, t+ (k − 1)Tb] [u(0)− u(t− Tb)] , (3.1.1)
where k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, and u(t) is a unit step function defined as
u(t) =
{
1, t ≥ 0
0, otherwise . (3.1.2)
Figure 3.1 illustrates the partitioning of a video signal into blocks. In each
block we encode Nb bits of the watermark message signal, m(u). This segmen-
tation ensures that message bits can be recovered from snippets of watermarked
30
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t = 0 t = 2Tb − 1t = Tb − 1
y = 0
y = Y − 1 x = X − 1
x = 0
Figure 3.1: The digital video signal, v, partitioned along the time axis by the
partitioning function, fb, into contiguous blocks, each containing Tb = 4 video frames.
The blue frames make up the first block, fb(v, 1), and the yellow frames make up
the second block, fb(v, 2).
video that still contain entire blocks. We denote the ith message bit encoded
into the kth video block as bki , where i ∈ {1, . . . , Nb}, and k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
3.1.2 Chip Signals
The “transform” step of STDM encoding and decoding involves multiplying the
host signal with a pseudo-noise chip signal. In our scheme, the ith bit, bki , of
the kth video block is encoded and decoded using a pseudorandomly generated
chip signal ski [x′, y′, t′], where x′ ∈ {0, . . . , Xs − 1}, y′ ∈ {0, . . . , Ys − 1}, and
t′ ∈ {0, . . . , Ts−1}. We choose Xs  X, Ys  Y , and Ts  Tb in order to give
the chip signal a significantly lower spatial and temporal resolution than the
host signal. This is intended to allow the decoder to tolerate minor temporal
and spatial misalignment of the video signal with respect to ski [x′, y′, t′].
We generate ski [x′, y′, t′] as follows. Let Ωk be the set of all possible co-
ordinates, [x′′, y′′, t′′], where x′′ ∈ {0, . . . , Xs − 1}, y′′ ∈ {0, . . . , Ys − 1}, and
t′′ ∈ {0, . . . , Ts − 1}. We randomly partition Ωk into Nb + 1 disjoint subsets,
such that
Ωk =
Nb+1⋃
i=1
Ωki . (3.1.3)
For i ∈ {1, . . . , Nb}, |Ωki| = Ns, where
Ns = weight(ski) = bXsYsTs/Nbc (3.1.4)
is the number of coordinates corresponding to non-zero values of ski [x′, y′, t′].
ΩkNb+1 is the set of coordinates not assigned to any chip signal when XsYsTs
is not integer divisible by Nb, such that |ΩkNb+1| = XsYsTs −NbbXsYsTs/Nbc.
The chip signal, ski [x′, y′, t′], is given by
ski [x
′, y′, t′] =
∑
[x′′,y′′,t′′]∈Ωki
s′k[x
′, y′, t′]δ[x′ − x′′, y′ − y′′, t′ − t′′], (3.1.5)
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Figure 3.2: Example of a chip signal, s12 [x′, y′, t′], that is used to encode the second
message bit in the first video block. The shaded regions correspond to the locations
where s12 [x′, y′, t′] is non-zero. The low resolution chip signal is shown here overlaid
onto the high resolution host signal, v[x, y, t], with the frames of the first block of
v drawn using dashed lines. In this example, the host video resolution is given by
X = 10, Y = 6, Tb = 4, and the chip signal resolution is given by Xs = 5, Ys = 3,
Ts = 2. Therefore, each non-zero region of s12 covers 2 × 2 pixels ×2 frames of the
host signal, and is referred to as a cell.
where i ∈ {1, . . . , Nb}, δ[x′ − x′0, y′ − y′0, t′ − t′0] is the Kronecker delta and
s′k[x
′, y′, t′] is a function generated by a uniform random selection from the set
{−1, 1} for each coordinate in Ωk. Figure 3.2 shows an example of a single
chip signal within a video block.
3.1.3 Downsampling and Spread-Transformation
Before a video signal block can be multiplied with a chip signal, it must be
downsampled to the spatial and temporal resolution of the chip signal. We
represent the downsampling operation as a transform, D{v}, from the video
block, vk[x, y, t] = fb(v, k), consisting of Tb X × Y -pixel frames to the low
resolution video signal, v˜k[x′, y′, t′], consisting of Ts Xs× Ys-pixel frames, such
that
v˜k[x
′, y′, t′] = D{vk[x, y, t]}, (3.1.6)
where x′ ∈ {0, . . . , Xs − 1}, y′ ∈ {0, . . . , Ys − 1}, and t′ ∈ {0, . . . , Ts − 1}. We
calculate D{vk[x, y, t]} as follows:
D{vk[x, y, t]} = 1
XcYcTc
Xc−1∑
i′=0
Yc−1∑
j′=0
Tc−1∑
k′=0
vk
[
x′Xc + i′, y′Yc + j′, t′Tc + k′
]
, (3.1.7)
where Xc = bX/Xsc, Yc = bY/Ysc, and Tc = bTb/Tsc are the width and height,
in pixels, and length, in frames, respectively, of the region of the video signal
that affects a single value of the downsampled version of that video. We refer
to such a region as a cell. We also define a new spread-transformation function,
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Host video
block, vk[x, y, t]
+
UpsampleDownsample
Spread-
transform
Watermarked
video block,
v
(u)
k [x, y, t]
Calculate
watermark
signal
Figure 3.3: Diagram of the digital watermark encoder. The kth block of the host
video, vk[x, y, t], is first downsampled to the resolution of the chip signals. Finally
the watermark signal is upsampled to the resolution of the host, and added to it to
give the watermarked video block, v(u)k [x, y, t].
f˜p, which projects the downsampled version of a video block, vk[x, y, t], onto a
given chip signal, s[x′, y′, t′], as
f˜p(vk[x, y, t], s[x
′, y′, t′]) =
Xs−1∑
x′=0
Ys−1∑
y′=0
Ts−1∑
t′=0
s[x′, y′, t′]D{vk[x, y, t]}. (3.1.8)
3.1.4 The Encoder
Figure 3.3 shows a diagram of the watermark encoder. The host video, v[x, y, t],
is first partitioned into blocks using (3.1.1). The kth block of v is vk = fb(v, k).
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , Nb}, the encoder calculates f˜p(vk[x, y, t], ski [x′, y′, t′]), us-
ing (3.1.8), and then finds the nearest DM value that encodes the bit bki , given
by
q˜STDM(vk, bki ,∆, ski) = qDM
(
f˜p(vk[x, y, t], ski [x
′, y′, t′]), bki ,∆
)
, (3.1.9)
where qDM is defined in (2.1.2). The quantiser step size, ∆, used for encoding
and decoding, depends on the parameters of the chip signal, ski , and its value
is calculated later in (3.1.15).
The next step in the STDM encoding procedure is to calculate the low
resolution watermark signal, w(u)ki [x
′, y′, t′], for each bit bki , such that
f˜p(vk + w
(u)
ki
, ski) = q˜STDM(vk, bki ,∆, ski). (3.1.10)
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Let zki be the scalar difference between the DM value that encodes bki and the
value of the projection of vk onto ski , given by
zki = q˜STDM(vk, bki ,∆, ski)− f˜p(vk, ski). (3.1.11)
Let w˜(u)ki [x
′, y′, t′] denote the watermark signal, w(u)ki [x, y, t], downsampled to
the resolution on ski , so that
w˜
(u)
ki
[x′, y′, t′] = D
{
w
(u)
ki
[x, y, t]
}
. (3.1.12)
From (2.1.7), w˜(u)ki is calculated as
w˜
(u)
ki
=
zkiski
weight(ski)
. (3.1.13)
In our implementation, we limit w˜(u)ki [x
′, y′, t′], so that when the magnitude
of w˜(u)ki [x
′, y′, t′] is a maximum, the maximum magnitude of the change in
the pixel values of the host video is equal to 1. This condition occurs when
w˜
(u)
ki
[x′, y′, t′] = ski [x
′, y′, t′]. That is,
max
(
w˜
(u)
ki
)
=
max(zki)ski
Ns
= ski , (3.1.14)
where Ns = weight(ski), and max(zki) is the maximum distance between the
DM value that encodes bki and the projection of the host signal onto ski . In
Figure 2.4 on page 13 we see that max(zki) = ∆/2. Substituting into (3.1.14),
we get
∆ = 2Ns. (3.1.15)
We choose this value of ∆ to be used by the encoder and decoder.
Using (3.1.13) would result in values of w(u)ki that are not necessarily inte-
gral. Since the pixel values of the digital video signal are integers, we want
the watermark signal to also be integral. We do this by randomly selecting a
subset Ω′ki of Ωki such that |Ω′ki| = round(zki), and calculating w˜
(u)
ki
as
w˜
(u)
ki
[x′, y′, t′] = sgn(zki)
∑
[x′′,y′′,t′′]∈Ω′ki
s′[x′, y′, t′]δ[x′−x′′, y′−y′′, t′−t′′]. (3.1.16)
The total low resolution watermark signal for block vk, w˜
(u)
k [x
′, y′, t′], is then
given by
w˜
(u)
k [x
′, y′, t′] =
Nb∑
i=1
w˜
(u)
ki
[x′, y′, t′]. (3.1.17)
This signal is then upsampled to the resolution of the host video signal,
v[x, y, t], by simply repeating the value at each coordinate of w˜(u)k [x
′, y′, t′]
over its corresponding cell to give
w
(u)
k [x, y, t] = w˜
(u)
k [bx/Xcc, by/Ycc, bt/Tcc] , (3.1.18)
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM DESIGN 35
for x ∈ {0, . . . , X−1} and y ∈ {0, . . . , Y −1}, and t ∈ {0, . . . , Tb−1}. Finally,
the encoder generates the watermarked video block, v(u)k [x, y, t], as
v
(u)
k [x, y, t] = vk[x, y, t] + w
(u)
k [x, y, t]. (3.1.19)
3.1.5 Attacks on the Watermark
A pirate wishing to distribute the watermarked video, v(u)[x, y, t], may attempt
to attack the video with the intention of preventing the decoder from finding
a valid watermark signal. We consider this attack to be a combination of
amplitude scaling (gain), frame de-synchronisation, and noise addition. The
pirate version of v(u)[x, y, t] is then given by
p(u)[x, y, t] = α(t)fr
(
v(u)[x, y, t]
)
+ n[x, y, t], (3.1.20)
where α(t) is the applied pixel value scaling factor, which may vary over the
duration of the video signal, n[x, y, t] is an added noise signal, and fr is a
function that modifies the frame structure of the watermarked video. We
assume that quick variations of α(t) would result in unacceptable flicker and
degradation of the pirate video, so that α(t) varies slowly with time. We further
assume that α(t) is approximately constant over the duration of a video block,
so that over the kth block, α(t) ≈ αk for all t ∈ {(k − 1)Tb, . . . , kTb − 1}.
The frame modifying function, fr, can involve frame rate conversion and
deletion of frames. The attack may also involve changing the location of the
watermarked video blocks within the video. Deleting frames that occur before
a block will cause that block to start earlier in the attacked video than in the
original watermarked video. Adding or removing entire segments of contiguous
frames by, for example, removing title sequences or adding segments of “black”,
could also cause significant changes to the locations of blocks. In some cases,
a pirate may even change the order of scenes within a movie, which would
reorder some video blocks. If a significant part of a single block is removed
or cut off by reordering, then that block will likely not be correctly decodable
from the video. For this reason, message bits should be embedded with enough
redundancy between blocks so that the message can still be recovered when
some blocks are lost.
3.1.6 Video Block Synchronisation
Figure 3.4 shows a diagram of the digital watermark decoder. When the pirate
version of v(u), p(u), is received, the decoder must identify the block, p(u)k [x, y, t],
in p(u) corresponding to the block, v(u)k [x, y, t], in v
(u) for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
The decoder is perfectly synchronised with the encoder for the kth video block
when each pixel in p(u)k [x, y, t] corresponds to the pixel in v
(u)
k [x, y, t] at the
same coordinates. That is,
p
(u)
ksync
[x, y, t] = αkv
(u)
k [x, y, t] + nk[x, y, t], (3.1.21)
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Figure 3.4: Diagram of the digital watermark decoder.
where nk[x, y, t] is the noise signal over block k, and
v
(u)
k [x, y, t] = fb(v
(u), k) (3.1.22)
is the kth watermarked video block.
In order to achieve temporal synchronisation, the decoder must locate the
part of the pirate video signal corresponding to each block of the watermarked
video, and attempt to reverse any frame modifications made to the block by
fr. We approximate p
(u)
k as
p
(u)
k [x, y, t] ≈ αkfb
(
v
(u)
k [x, y, rkt+ θk], k
)
+ nk[x, y, t], (3.1.23)
where rk is an approximate factor by which the frame rate of v
(u)
k [x, y, t] has
been sped up or slowed down, and θk is the frame offset of fr(v
(u)
k [x, y, t]) from
v
(u)
k [x, y, t]. From (3.1.21), (3.1.22), and (3.1.23) we can see that for rk = 1
and θk = 0, pk and v
(u)
k are synchronised. Therefore, in order to achieve
synchronisation when rk 6= 1 and θk 6= 0, the decoder must estimate rk and
θk, and use these estimates to generate an estimate of p
(u)
ksync
, pˆ(u)ksync , given by
pˆ
(u)
ksync
[x, y, t] = fb
{
p[x, y, (t− θˆk)/rˆk], k
}
, (3.1.24)
where rˆk and θˆk are the decoder estimates of rk and θk, respectively. In order to
simplify finding rˆk, we fix the frame rate at which the simple decoder decodes
watermarks to be rdec frames per second (FPS). The decoder converts any video
it receives to rdec FPS before decoding. Therefore, in order to synchronise with
the decoder, the encoder must embed watermarks at rdec FPS. This does not,
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however, limit the watermarking scheme to videos with a frame rate of rdec
FPS, since the frame rate of the watermarked videos may be converted by
the CP from rdec to the desired frame rate. This conversion would simply be
reversed by the decoder.
If the frame rate of a watermarked video is simply converted to rconv 6= rdec
by a pirate using some video conversion tool, then the conversion is reversed by
the decoder when the frame rate of p(u) is converted back to rdec, and therefore
rk will simply be equal to 1. However, if a number of frames are deleted from
a particular block of watermarked video then the frame rate over that block is
effectively reduced since there are now fewer frames that represent that block.
The ratio of the number of frames of block k present in the pirate video to the
number of frames in v(u)k then gives an approximation of rk.
The decoder finds rˆk and θˆk for pk by sweeping the value of rˆk over the set
R, and sweeping the value of θˆk over the set Θ, where
Θ = {1, 2 . . . , T − Tb}, (3.1.25)
and the choice of values in R is an implementation detail that is discussed in
Chapter 4. For each value of rˆ′k ∈ R and θˆ′k ∈ Θ, the decoder generates the
scalar DM value, zˆki(rˆ′k, θˆ′k), corresponding to each decoded bit bˆki , given by
zˆki(rˆ
′
k, θˆ
′
k) = f˜p
(
fb
{
p(u)
[
x, y, (t− θˆ′k)/rˆ′k
]
, k
}
, ski
)
, (3.1.26)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , Nb}, and f˜p is defined in (3.1.8). The decoder then carries
out the gain estimation algorithm, described in the following section, using
zˆki(rˆ
′
k, θˆ
′
k) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , Nb}. The gain estimation algorithm produces a
likelihood score for each combination of αˆ′k, rˆ′k, and θˆ′k tested. The maximum
scoring combination is then used for the decoder-estimated values.
3.1.7 Gain Estimation
We implement a similar gain estimation method to the one presented by Eggers
et al. in [44]. The decoder generates the histogram, hk[ζ], of zˆki(rˆ′k, θˆ′k) for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , Nb}, using a bin size of ∆bin given by
∆bin =
∆
f∆
, (3.1.27)
where f∆ is a constant factor that determines the resolution of the histogram
relative to the quantiser step size used by the encoder.
As shown in Figure 2.9 on page 18, if the noise signal is small, hk[ζ] should
have peaks centred on the bins containing q˜STDM(αkvk, bki , αk∆, ski) for i ∈
{1, . . . , Nb}. These DM modulated magnitudes take on values in {kαk∆/2 +
αk∆/4, k ∈ Z}, which means that hk[ζ] appears somewhat periodic with period
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αk∆/2. The histogram should therefore have a large frequency component at
fh = 2/(αk∆). The decoder estimate of fh, fˆh, is calculated as
fˆh = arg max
f
(|Hk[f ]|) fs, (3.1.28)
where Hk[f ] is the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of the histogram hk[ζ],
defined as
Hk[f ] =
Nb−1∑
ζ=0
hk[ζ]e
−j2pifζ/Nb , (3.1.29)
and fs is the sampling frequency of h[ζ], given by
fs =
1
∆bin
. (3.1.30)
The decoder can then determine αˆk, an estimate of αk, by comparing fˆh to
the expected quantiser step size, ∆:
αˆk =
2
∆fˆh
. (3.1.31)
The decoder calculates a likelihood score between 0 and 1 as
βk = max(|Hk[f ]|)/Nb. (3.1.32)
A large value of βk results when hk[z] has a large component with period
αk∆/2, indicating that fb(p(u)[x, y, (t− θˆ′k)/rˆ′k], k) is likely to have been STDM
modulated with a step size of αˆk∆. Therefore, the decoder can use βk as
a measure confidence that fb(p(u)[x, y, (t − θˆ′k)/rˆ′k], k) corresponds to the kth
block of the watermarked video, v(u), and that αˆk = αk.
Let αˆk(rˆ′k, θˆ′k) be the estimated gain and βk(rˆ′k, θˆ′k) be the corresponding
likelihood score, calculated as above, for the frame rate scaling factor, rˆ′k, and
block offset, θˆ′k. The final decoder estimated values of rk, θk, and αk are then
given by
rˆk = arg max
rˆ′k∈R
[
βk(rˆ
′
k, θˆ
′
k)
]
, (3.1.33)
θˆk = arg max
θˆ′k∈Θ
[
βk(rˆ
′
k, θˆ
′
k)
]
, (3.1.34)
αˆk = αˆk(rˆk, θˆk), (3.1.35)
respectively. The decoder then calculates the decoder synchronised block,
pˆ
(u)
ksync
[x, y, t], from these estimated parameters using (3.1.24).
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3.1.8 Watermark Message Decoding
Once the decoder has estimated the temporal synchronisation and amplitude
scaling parameters, the watermark message bits can be decoded from the re-
ceived video signal. For the kth video block, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , Nb}, the de-
coder determines the decoded bit, bˆki , by applying the decoding rule in (2.1.10)
to pˆ(u)ksync [x, y, t], using a quantiser step size scaled by αˆ, to give
bˆki = arg min
b′∈{0,1}
∣∣∣f˜p (pˆ(u)ksync [x, y, t], ski)− q˜STDM (pˆ(u)ksync , b′, αˆk∆, ski)∣∣∣ , (3.1.36)
where q˜STDM is defined in (3.1.9). The bits decoded from each watermarked
block are then used to construct the message signal, m˜(u), by reversing the
method used by the encoder to distribute the bits of m(u) among the video
blocks.
3.2 The Dynamic Traitor Tracing Scheme
In this section we describe the design of a dynamic traitor tracing algorithm
that can be used to make our digital watermarking scheme (or other suitable
digital watermarking schemes) robust against collusion attacks. Our scheme
is designed to be used in broadcast systems where feedback from the pirate
redistribution is available to the CP. Like the FT scheme, our dynamic trac-
ing algorithm is executed in iterations, and during each iteration a segment
of video content is broadcast. Our scheme also partitions the users in U into
subsets, and each subset is assigned a differently watermarked variant of each
segment. Unlike the original FT scheme [18], described in Section 2.2.6, our
scheme is designed in such a way that video segments are marked before broad-
cast, regardless of whether previous marked segments have been received. The
aim of this approach is to continue to trace pirates during the delay between
the transmission of marked segments and the receipt of illegally rebroadcast
segments. When feedback from the pirate rebroadcast is delayed, we will show
that this reduces the time needed to disconnect all pirates.
3.2.1 Delay Tolerant Search Tree
In our scheme we trace colluding pirates using a search tree similar to the one
used by Fiat and Tassa in [28], consisting of Nl levels. Again, let U be the set
of users to which the CP distributes content. Let D be the set of users that
have been disconnected by the CP. Within the kth tree level with 1 ≤ k ≤ Nl,
let Wk be the set of disjoint user sets W ⊂ U for all W ∈ Wk suspected of
containing pirates, and let W ′k ⊆ U be the set of users that did not contain
any detected pirates at the time that level k was generated. Let Gp be the set
of disjoint user sets, where each set, G ∈ Gp, is known to contain at least one
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pirate. We refer to each set in Gp as being guilty. Let I be the set of users that
does not contain a detected pirate. We refer to I as being innocent, however
this is merely an assumption made until the existence of a pirate in this set is
determined. Let Sp be a set of user sets suspected of containing pirates, such
that for each set of users G ∈ Gp there are a number of disjoint sets of users in
Sp whose union is G. The tree is initialised by setting I = U , Gp = ∅, Sp = ∅,
D = ∅, W0 = ∅, W ′ = U , and l = 0.
Algorithm 1 The tree level generating function.
function NewLevel
Nl ← Nl + 1
W ′Nl ← I
WNl ← ∪{Split(Q) ∀ Q ∈ Sp}
S ← WNl
end function
Algorithm 1 shows the function used to generate a new level of the search
tree. A new level is generated after each video segment has been transmitted.
When a new level is generated, the current tree level, Nl, is incremented, and
each set of suspect users in Sp is split into two new, approximately equally
sized subsets, using the splitting function shown in Algorithm 2. Note that
the only requirement of the splitting function is that the size of each of the
resulting disjoint subsets is half that of the original set. Which of the original
users end up in either set is arbitrary. The set of resulting user sets is denoted
WNl . Each user set in WNl is assigned a unique segment variant. The users
in the innocent set, I, are added to W ′Nl . If W
′
Nl
6= ∅ then W ′Nl also receives
a unique segment variant. Section 3.2.3 discusses the watermarking of video
segment variants.
Algorithm 2 The user set splitting function.
function Split(S)
return {S1, S2 ⊂ S : |S1| − |S2| ≤ 1, S \ S2 = S1}
end function
When feedback from a pirate redistribution indicates that at least one user
belonging to a particular set P ∈ Wk ∪ {W ′k} is contributing to the collusion-
attacked pirate copy, the function described in Algorithm 3 is applied to the
search tree. Section 3.2.3 discusses how the feedback is used to incriminate P
as containing at least one pirate. The basic operation of Algorithm 3 can be
described as follows.
If P is a subset of one of the guilty sets G ∈ Gp, then the algorithm assumes
that all other users in G are innocent, removes G \ P from G, as well as from
any suspect sets in Sp, and adds them to the innocent set, I. Any empty
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set in Sp is removed from Sp. If all users in P were assumed innocent, i.e.
P ⊆ I, then a new suspect set, containing all users in P , is added to Sp. If
|P | = 1 then the single user in P is identified as a pirate, disconnected from
the broadcast, removed from any sets that contain that user, and added to D.
Algorithm 3 The filter function.
function Filter(P )
for all G ∈ Gp do . Check if P is a subset of a guilty set.
if P ⊆ G then . If so,
I ← I ∪G \ P . assume the rest of the guilty set is innocent.
if |P | = 1 then . If there is only one user in P ,
D ← D ∪ P . disconnect user in P .
Sp ← {Q : Q = (S \G) 6= ∅ ∀S ∈ Sp} . Remove G
. from suspects.
Gp ← Gp \ {P} . Remove P from guilty sets.
else
Sp ← {Q : Q = S \ (G \ P ) 6= ∅ ∀S ∈ Sp} . Remove G \ P
. from suspects.
Gp ← (Gp \G) ∪ {P} . Add P to guilty sets.
end if
else
Sp ← {S : S ∈ Sp, S 6⊆ G} ∪ {G} . Recombine subsets of G.
end if
end for
if P ⊆ I then . If P incriminates “innocent” users,
I ← I \ P . remove P from innocent set.
if |P | = 1 then . If there is only on user in P ,
D ← D ∪ P . disconnect user in P .
else
Gp ← Gp ∪ {P} . Add P to guilty sets.
Sp ← Sp ∪ {P} . Add P to suspect sets.
end if
end if
end function
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show an example of the use of Algorithms 1 and 3 to
trace two colluding pirates, u2 and u7, amongst eight users. The states of the
sets, I, Gp, Sp, WNl , W ′Nl , and D are shown after each algorithm is executed.
The argument to the filtering function is the set of users incriminated by the
receipt of a watermarked variant that was transmitted to that set of users.
After the two colluding pirates have been disconnected, all other users are
returned to the innocent set, I.
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Figure 3.5: An example of traitor tracing using the search tree, illustrating the
effect of each algorithm on the states of the user sets, I, Gp, Sp, WNl , W
′
Nl
. Each
set is represented by a block, and blocks within blocks represent sets within sets.
The two colluding pirates, u2 and u7, are eventually singled out and disconnected,
leaving all other users in the innocent set, I.
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Figure 3.6: Example of traitor tracing using the search tree (continued from Fig-
ure 3.5).
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3.2.2 Comparison with Fiat and Tassa Search Tree
Our search tree operates very similarly to that of the FT scheme [18], described
in Section 2.2.6, except that the tree level generating function in Algorithm 1,
and the tree filtering function in Algorithm 3 can be applied to the tree in-
dependently of each other, at any time. This means that, whenever marked
segments are received from a pirate broadcast, the search tree is updated based
on the incriminated set of users. However, while the CP waits to receive de-
layed pirate segments, the search tree can still continue to narrow the search
for pirates.
Immediately before a new video segment is to be broadcast, Algorithm 1
is used to partition U into the subsets that will each receive unique variants.
If no set of users has yet been incriminated by a previously received variant,
then every set that is not assumed innocent is split in half for the next iter-
ation. This is in contrast to the FT scheme, where only a set that has been
incriminated by a received variant is split. Our scheme uses the filter function
in Algorithm 3 to remove the extraneous user sets from the search tree as soon
as it is clear from the received variants that those sets are indeed extraneous.
When a user set, P , is incriminated, any extra suspect sets generated by the
new level function in Algorithm 1 in an attempt to trace the pirates in P , but
which have now been found not to contain P , are returned to I. Although the
extraneous user sets are eventually removed from the search tree, the extra
sets require more than the minimum number of variants to be generated for
each segment. Therefore our scheme uses more than 2Nc + 1 variants to trace
Nc pirates. This trade-off allows the search tree to progress even when feed-
back from previous segments is delayed, which allows the scheme to disconnect
all pirates more quickly than the FT scheme, which wastes time waiting for
previous segments.
3.2.3 Segment Marking Using Dynamic Tardos Codes
We now describe how we construct the watermark messages embedded in each
variant of each video segment, and how we incriminate a particular set of users
when a pirate segment is received. Immediately prior to the broadcast of the
kth video segment, our scheme generates a new level of the search tree and
generates a unique variant for each non-empty set of users in Wk ∪ {W ′k}. Let
ck be the number of unique variants transmitted during iteration k, given by
ck =
{ |Wk|, if W ′k = ∅
|Wk|+ 1, if W ′k 6= ∅. (3.2.1)
Let m(W,k) be the unique watermark message assigned to a particular non-
empty user set, W ∈ Wk ∪ {W ′k}, during the kth iteration. Each segment mes-
sage, m(W,k), is further partitioned into sub-segment messages, where m(W,k,i)
is the ith sub-segment of m(W,k). The purpose of this partitioning is to allow
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the tracing algorithm to shorten m(W,k) when it is determined that a shorter
code length is sufficient for the kth iteration. The watermark messages for
W ∈ Wk ∪ {W ′k}, and i ∈ 1, . . . , ck − 1 are constructed using the dynamic
Tardos scheme of Laarhoven et al. [16], which we described in Section 2.2.5 of
the previous chapter. We construct the codewords as follows.
1. For each bit position j, 1 ≤ j ≤ l(ck, ck, 1, 2), select ρ′j independently
randomly from a uniform distribution over [δmin, pi2 − δmin], where δmin =
δ(ck, ck, 1, 2)].
2. Calculate the vector, p(c), for c ∈ {2, . . . , ck}, as in step 2 of the con-
struction on page 25.
3. Setm(W,k)j = 1 with probability ρj = sin
2ρ′j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l(ck, ck, 1, 2),
and non-empty user set W ∈ Wk ∪ {W ′k}.
4. For c ≥ 0 define
lmin(c) =
{
min
{[
j′ :
∑j′
j=1 p(c)j = l(c, ck, 1, 2)
]}
, c ≥ 2
0 , c < 2
,
(3.2.2)
which gives the minimum number of bits after which m(W,k) can be trun-
cated, where the truncated version is still an 1-sound, 2-complete dy-
namic Tardos codeword for a maximum of c collaborating pirates. For
each non-empty user set W ∈ Wk ∪ {W ′k}, and i ∈ 1, . . . , ck − 1, let the
ith watermark message sub-segment, m(W,k,i), be given by
m(W,k,i) =
[
m
(W,k)
lmin(i)
m
(W,k)
lmin(i)+1
. . . m
(W,k)
lmin(i+1)
]
. (3.2.3)
Figure 3.7 illustrates the partitioning of a watermark segment message,m(W,k),
into sub-segments for ck = 5. When the ith watermarked sub-segment that was
originally transmitted in the kth iteration is received, the collusion-attacked wa-
termark message, m(C,k,i), is decoded from that sub-segment and the following
steps are carried out.
1. Append to the other sub-segments from the kth iteration to give the
current segment watermark message, m(C,k), given by
m(C,k) =
[
m(C,k,0) m(C,k,1) . . . m(C,k,i)
]
. (3.2.4)
2. Construct the score vector, s′(W ) for each non-empty user set W ∈
Wk ∪ {W ′k} as follows:
s′(W )j =

+
√
(1− ρj)/ρj, if m(W,k)j = 1 and m(C,k)j = 1
−√ρj/(1− ρj), if m(W,k)j = 0 and m(C,k)j = 1
−√(1− ρj)/ρj, if m(W,k)j = 1 and m(C,k)j = 0
+
√
ρj/(1− ρj), if m(W,k)j = 0 and m(C,k)j = 0 .
(3.2.5)
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Figure 3.7: Illustration of the partitioning of a segment watermark message,m(W,k),
into sub-segments, where the ith sub-segment is m(W,k,i). At the beginning of this
iteration of the dynamic traitor tracing scheme, five differently watermarked variants
are transmitted. The minimum number of watermark message bits required for an
1-sound, 2-secure Tardos code for c variants is given by lmin(c). If feedback from
previous iterations indicates that, for example, only four variants are being used for
the collusion attack, then this iteration will end after m(W,k,3) is transmitted, since
enough watermark message bits will have been transmitted to incriminate at least
one of the four variants.
3. For each non-empty user set W ∈ Wk ∪ {W ′k}, and each value of c ∈
{1, . . . , ck}, update the accusation score,
sdyn
(
W, c,m(C,k)
)
=
lmin(i+1)∑
j=1
s′(W )jp(c)j, (3.2.6)
and incriminate the user set W if sdyn(W, c,m(C,k)) > τ(c, ck, 1, 2) for
any c.
If the pirates in C generated the pirate video segment using parts from more
than one of the video segments available to them, then the incrimination step
of iteration k may incriminate more than one user set as containing one of the
pirates. More incriminated user sets increase the number of suspect sets in Sp,
which increases ck+1, and means that more differently watermarked variants
will need to be generated during the following iteration. Since the number of
message bits required by the Tardos codeword construction increases propor-
tionally to c2k+1, this means that a significantly longer watermark message is
needed for iteration k + 1.
Let P ′k be the set of user sets incriminated by the collusion-attacked mes-
sage, m(C,k). When |P ′k| > 1, we simply choose one of the incriminated sets.
The incriminated set that we choose to use for the search tree filtering function
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in Algorithm 3 is given by
P = arg min
W∈P ′k
(|W |), (3.2.7)
which is simply the incriminated set containing the fewest users. This corre-
sponds to the branch of the search tree that has narrowed down the most on a
particular pirate. The advantage of this choice is that it allows singleton user
sets to be generated and incriminated quickly. Every time a pirate is incrimi-
nated, all other users in the suspect set containing that pirate are moved to the
innocent set, I. This reduces the number of suspect user sets, and therefore
watermarked variants required for the rest of the algorithm. Fewer water-
marked variants require shorter Tardos codes, and the algorithm can trace all
pirates using fewer watermark bits.
3.2.4 The Complete Dynamic Traitor Tracing Scheme
Algorithm 4 represents the entire dynamic traitor tracing scheme. The scheme
operates on the search tree described in Section 3.2.1. During the kth iteration
the sub-segments watermarked with m(W,k,i) are transmitted in sequence to
each set W 6= ∅ ∈ Wk ∪ {W ′k} of users. As the transmission of segment k
progresses, previous watermarked segments may be received (after some delay
after their transmission). The received segments are used by the filter function
in Algorithm 3 to narrow down the sets of suspect users in Sp, thereby adding
users to the innocent set, I. This may result in a reduction in |Sp|, which is
the estimated maximum number of differently watermarked variants available
to the pirates in C. The transmission of segment k ends when the number
of watermark message bits transmitted during the segment is greater than or
equal to the number of bits required by the dynamic Tardos code construction
for 1-sound, 2-complete incrimination when at most |Sp| variants are used
for collusion. This prompts transmission of the next watermarked segment to
begin. Figure 3.8 illustrates the process of tracing one pirate within a set of
four users.
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Figure 3.8: Diagram illustrating the operation of the delay tolerant search tree
when tracing a single pirate among four users. Each coloured bar represents a user.
The bar labelled “Tx” represents the transmitted video segments containing the wa-
termark messages, m(W,k). The dashed lines show the start of the kth segment. The
bar labelled “Rx” represents the pirate video segments, received by the CP after
a delay of tdelay, containing the watermark messages, m(C,k). At the beginning of
each iteration, each suspect set of users is split in half until a singleton set is gener-
ated. If the user in the singleton set is incriminated then that user is immediately
disconnected.
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Algorithm 4 The Complete Dynamic Traitor Tracing Scheme.
for all k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} do
NewLevel
Set i = 0.
Generate m(W,k) for all W ∈ WNl ∪ {W ′Nl}, W 6= ∅.
while i <= |S| do
for all W 6= ∅ ∈ WNl ∪ {W ′Nl} do
Watermark the host segment, v(k,i), with m(W,k,i) to give v(W,k,i).
Transmit v(W,k,i) to all users in W .
end for
for all received pirate segments, v(C,k′), k′ ≤ k do
Extract watermark message, m(C,k).
Incriminate user set P = arg min
W∈P ′
k′
(|W |).
Filter(P )
end for
Increment i.
end while
end for
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Detail Design
We now describe the details of the implementation of the designs presented in
the previous chapter. Since the intention is to design a prototype scheme, we
implemented the algorithms in software, using the Python programming lan-
guage [49]. While Python is generally slower at high-computation tasks than
C or Fortran, it allows for faster and simpler prototyping [50]. Additionally,
the NumPy mathematical Python library [51] provided the tools necessary to
quickly write efficient mathematical routines.
4.1 The Digital Watermarking Scheme
The prototype digital watermarking scheme, described in Section 3.1 of the
previous chapter, requires a number of parameters, which can affect its per-
formance in terms of security, fidelity, and robustness. Here we discuss the
values we chose for these parameters. In some cases the parameters are chosen
for practicality or simplicity, and therefore do not necessarily result in optimal
performance. However, the objective of this thesis is to evaluate a working
prototype, and the optimisation of parameters is left as future work.
4.1.1 Watermarking Parameters
Section 3.1 described a method of watermarking a single colour component of
a digital video. For the implementation we chose to watermark digital videos
where pixel colour values are represented in the Y ′CbCr colour space. We
chose Y ′CbCr for two reasons. Firstly, it is the colour space used in MPEG
encoded videos, as well as uncompressed video formats like YUV and Y4M.
This removes the need for colour space conversion, which can add computa-
tional complexity to the encoding and decoding operations. Secondly, Y ′CbCr
separates brightness and colour information. This is advantageous since the
human eye is generally more sensitive to brightness information than to colour
information [7]. In order to reduce the perceptibility of the watermark signal
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we applied the watermarking scheme to the two colour channels (Cb and Cr),
and left the luma channel unmodified.
We chose to implement the watermarking scheme using 1080p HD videos
with a luma channel spatial resolution of Xl = 1920 and Yl = 1080 pixels,
since this is a standard format for high definition video, and is the highest
resolution video that is currently widely available [52]. We chose to use a
chroma subsampling ratio of 4:2:0, because it is commonly used in MPEG
video [35]. This resulted in a colour channel spatial resolution of X = 960,
and Y = 540 pixels. We chose the encoding and decoding frame rate, rdec, to
be 29.97 FPS, which is the NTSC standard video frame rate [35]. We chose
the length of a watermark block, Tb, to be 60 frames, which is approximately
equal to 2 seconds of video playback.
We chose the resolution of the STDM chip signals to be Xs = 60, Ys = 33,
and Ts = 15. We let Ts be an integer factor of Tb to simplify the calculation of
the downsampled signal values used by the encoder and decoder. We chose to
use a watermark signal bit rate of Nb = 64 bits per video block for each colour
channel, which corresponds to approximately 64 bits of watermark signal per
second of video. Our choice of chip signal resolution, video block size and
watermark bits per video block result in Ns = 464 coordinates where the chip
signal corresponding to each bit is non-zero. According to (3.1.15), this allows
us to use a quantiser step size of ∆ = 928 for STDM encoding and decoding.
4.1.2 Decoding Parameters
The implementation of the watermark decoder requires parameters that affect
the functionality of the synchronisation process. Section 3.1.6 on page 35
described the temporal synchronisation process, where the decoder estimates
the effective frame rate scaling factor, rk, by sweeping over values from the set
R. In this implementation we chose
R = {1.05, 1, 0.95, 0.9, 0.85, 0.8}. (4.1.1)
Section 3.1.7 on page 37 discussed the estimation of the gain factor applied
to the watermarked video signal. In order to simplify the process of coun-
tering gain attacks we restrict the value of the gain attack factor, α(t) to
0.85 ≤ α(t) ≤ 1.15. We assume that values of α(t) outside these bounds will
produce unacceptable degradation to the video and need not be considered
for a practical video watermarking scheme. These bounds simplify analysis
by limiting the range of possible values that the decoder must consider. The
decoder estimates the gain factor by generating a histogram of the dither mod-
ulated watermark values. In our implementation the decoder uses a value of
f∆ = 50 in (3.1.27) to determine the histogram bin size.
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4.1.3 Video Processing Tools and Formats
For frame rate conversion and spatial resizing of videos, we used avconv, an
open-source command line video processing tool built using the multimedia
library, libav [53]. We also used this tool to perform the frame rate scaling
required by the temporal synchronisation process. In our implementation we
combined this step with the initial conversion of the received video to a frame
rate of rdec. Upon receiving a video p(u)[x, y, t] the decoder simply used avconv
to generate, for each rˆ′k ∈ R, the version of the received video, p(u)[x, y, t/rˆ′k]
with a frame rate of rdec/rˆ′k.
Our watermarking scheme is designed to watermark uncompressed digital
videos. We used the YUV4MPEG2 (Y4M) video format to store the uncom-
pressed videos, because of its simple file structure, which can easily be read
and written by Python scripts, and because it can easily be compressed into
other formats like MPEG. A Y4M video file consists of a header that includes
information about the video (including its width and height in pixels, and its
frame rate), followed by the video frames. Each frame is stored as an Xl × Yl
array of luma values, followed by two X × Y arrays of colour values. Each
element of these arrays is represented by a byte value.
4.2 The Dynamic Traitor Tracing Scheme
We implemented the traitor tracing scheme by writing a Python script to carry
out the algorithms described in Section 3.2 of the previous chapter. Since our
goal in this thesis is to prove the concept of the scheme, we designed the
implementation to work as part of a simulation of a broadcast environment
where a group of colluding pirates redistributes a pirate copy produced by a
collusion attack. We therefore simulated the users as well as the actions of the
colluding pirates.
The dynamic Tardos traitor tracing codes, which we used to watermark
the segment variants of our dynamic traitor tracing scheme, were constructed
using parameters that minimised the lengths of the codewords encoded into
each segment. In Section 2.2.5 of Chapter 2 we described the constraints
involved in optimising the codeword lengths. We carried out the optimisation
procedure numerically using the optimisation routines available in the SciPy
scientific library for Python [54]. For our implementation we generated 1-
secure codes where 1 = 0.01.
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Testing
In this chapter we test the robustness of our watermarking scheme against
some attacks to which a watermarked video might be subjected prior to re-
distribution as a pirate copy. Section 5.1 focusses on testing the robustness of
the digital watermarking scheme, described in Section 3.1. Robustness against
collusion attacks is provided by the dynamic traitor tracing scheme, described
in Section 3.2, which we test in Section 5.2.
5.1 The Watermarking Scheme
In this section we test the performance of the digital watermarking scheme.
This includes robustness against attacks that can be applied to a watermarked
video when only one video is available to the attacker. These attacks include
addition of noise, lossy video compression, resizing, frame rate changes, frame
deletion, amplitude scaling, recompression, and cropping.
5.1.1 Methodology
In order to test the robustness of the watermarking scheme against non-
collusion attacks we used the scheme to digitally watermark five different
uncompressed digital video clips, each consisting of 300 video frames. The
host video clips were stored in Y4M format with a (luma channel) spatial res-
olution of Hl = 1080 pixels, Wl = 1920 pixels, a frame rate of 29.97 FPS, and
a chroma subsampling ratio of 4:2:0. We generated ten different watermarked
versions of each host video for a total of fifty test videos. In each version,
a different randomly generated watermark message was encoded, using a dif-
ferent randomly generated chip function. The watermarked test videos were
generated using the parameters described in Section 4.1.1 on page 50.
We processed the watermarked videos using avconv to carry out the attacks
for each test, except for the AWGN, gain, and random frame deletion attacks,
where we used software we wrote in Python to carry out the attacks. Each
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attacked video was then input to the decoder, which generated a decoded
watermark message for that video. Since the prototype decoder is designed
to read uncompressed Y4M video files, we used avconv to decompress any
compressed attacked videos into Y4M format before decoding. The bit error
rate (BER) between each encoded message and its corresponding decoded
message was then calculated. For an arbitrary watermark message,m, encoded
in a watermarked video, and mˆ, the decoded watermark message, the BER is
given by
BER =
number of incorrect bits in mˆ
total number of bits in m
. (5.1.1)
When testing robustness we consider the two requirements for correct decoding
of watermark message bits described in Section 1.2.2 on page 3. The first
requirement is that the part of the watermark signal corresponding to each
message bit is not corrupted. The second requirement is that the decoder is
able to achieve both spatial and temporal synchronisation with the encoder,
so that each bit is decoded from the correct part of the watermarked signal.
For our STDM-based scheme, the decoder also has to estimate the possible
pixel value scaling factor applied to the watermarked video. We include this
gain attack estimation step when we refer to synchronisation.
In order to test the effectiveness of the synchronisation algorithm of our
decoder, for each attack tested we generated two different decoded messages,
and determined the BER for each of the two. The first message is generated
when our decoder is allowed to automatically synchronise with the encoder,
using the methods described in Sections 3.1.6 and 3.1.7. The second message is
generated by providing the correct synchronisation parameters to the decoder.
We say that the first message is generated using decoder synchronisation, and
the second message is generated using manual synchronisation. The BER un-
der manual synchronisation indicates the rate at which watermark message
bits are actually corrupted by an attack. If the BER under decoder synchro-
nisation is higher than under manual synchronisation, then the decoder was
unable to synchronise properly on parts of the watermark signal.
5.1.2 Document-to-Watermark Ratio
Section 1.2.2 on page 3 discussed document-to-watermark ratio (DWR) as a
means of determining the effect of the watermark signal on the fidelity of the
host signal. The objective of this test is to measure the average document-to-
watermark ratio of the watermarking scheme, using the parameters discussed
in Section 4.1.1 on page 50.
For each watermarked test video, we calculated the DWR according to the
definition in (1.2.1) on page 4. We measured the video signal amplitudes in
pixel values, which are integers in the range {0, . . . , 255}. Table 5.1 shows
the average variance of the host video signals, the average variance of the
watermark signals, and the average DWR of the watermarked host videos for
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Colour channel Host variance Watermark variance DWR
Cb 194.81 0.487 400.44
Cr 67.50 0.485 139.31
Table 5.1: Host signal variance, watermark signal variance, and document-to-
watermark ratio of the test videos. The variances are given in units of squared
pixel value, where the range of a pixel value is {0, . . . , 255}.
the Cb and Cr colour channels. The average variance of the watermark signal is
0.487 for the Cb channel, and 0.485 for the Cr channel. The host signal variance
of the Cb channel is 197.81. This is more than double the host variance of the
Cr channel, which is 67.5. The DWR for the Cb channel is therefore higher
than that of the Cr channel. This result may explain the difference between
the robustness of the Cb channel and Cr channel watermarks observed in some
of the tests that follow.
5.1.3 Basic System Test
The objective of the first test of the watermarking scheme is to show that
the watermarking scheme works as expected. We do this by showing that the
watermark extractor is capable of extracting the watermark message from an
uncompressed digital video that has been watermarked by the encoder.
For this test, we input the watermarked test videos, described in Sec-
tion 5.1.1, directly into the watermark decoder, without subjecting the videos
to any attack. We calculated the BER of the decoded watermark messages
according to the procedure in Section 5.1.1.
Since the watermarking scheme uses side information at the transmitter to
prevent interference between the host signal and the watermark signal, and
since the watermarked video is not modified after watermark encoding, the
channel noise is expected to be zero. Therefore, the expected result of this
experiment is that the decoder is able to decode the watermark messages from
the unmodified, watermarked videos with a BER of zero.
The result of this test was that the BER was exactly zero under both man-
ual and decoder synchronisation for every watermarked test video. This result
agrees with what was expected. In addition to calculating the BER, we gener-
ated two graphs that demonstrate the action of the decoder synchronisation.
Figure 5.1 shows the decoder-calculated likelihood, βk(rˆ′k, θˆ′k), that the kth wa-
termarked video block lies at frame offset θˆ′k with a frame rate scaling factor of
rˆ′k = 1. The distinct peaks at θˆ′k ∈ {0, 60, 120, 180, 240} show that the decoder
detected the watermarked video blocks using the correct decoding parameters.
Figure 5.2 shows the same graph, but for rˆ′k = 0.8. The likelihood scores are
low since the frame rate scaling factor is incorrect. The results confirm that
the watermarking scheme works correctly.
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Figure 5.1: βk(rˆ′k, θˆ
′
k) vs. θˆ
′
k for the Cr channel of one of the test videos, where rˆ
′
k =
1. The distinct peaks indicate a high certainty of these synchronisation parameters,
which is expected since these are the correct parameters.
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Figure 5.2: βk(rˆ′k, θˆ
′
k) vs. θˆ
′
k for the Cr channel of one of the test videos, where
rˆ′k = 0.8. The lack of distinct peaks indicates a low certainty of these synchronisation
parameters, which is expected since rˆ′k = 0.8 is a poor estimate.
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Figure 5.3: Execution time of the encoder and decoder vs. video length.
5.1.4 Computational Complexity
The objective of this test is to determine the time taken to encode and decode
a watermark, as well as the memory required. This gives us an indication of
the type of hardware required to implement the encoder and decoder.
For this test, we watermarked ten versions of each of the five host videos,
while recording the computation time and memory used by the watermark en-
coder process. The watermarked videos were passed directly to the watermark
decoder, without subjecting the videos to any attack. The computation time
and memory usage of the decoding process were also measured. The encoder
and decoder algorithms, written in Python, were run on a desktop personal
computer equipped with a 3.4 GHz quad-core processor and 32 GB of memory.
Figure 5.3 shows the execution time of the encoder and decoder software
as the length of the host video increases. The execution time of the encoder
increases linearly with video length, at an average encoding rate of 16.2 FPS.
This encoding rate is half of the 29.97 FPS necessary for real-time watermark
encoding. Optimisation of the encoding algorithm, and implementation of the
encoder in a compiled language like C, may allow the encoder to watermark
videos in real-time. This is useful for watermarking of live video streams,
where content is not available prior to broadcast.
The execution time of the decoder also increases roughly linearly with video
length, but at a much lower average rate of 2.8 FPS. One reason for slow exe-
cution is that the sweeping of parameters during decoder synchronisation was
executed sequentially. In a broadcast setting, using dynamic traitor tracing,
watermark decoding also needs to be performed in real-time. The slow per-
formance of the decoder may be acceptable if watermark decoding is carried
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Figure 5.4: Memory usage of the encoder and decoder vs. video length.
out by the CP on powerful hardware that runs a parallelised version of the
decoder software.
Figure 5.4 shows the memory usage of the encoder and decoder software as
the length of the host video increases. The decoder memory usage increases
roughly linearly from 54 MB for a 60-frame video to 56 MB for a 300-frame
video. The encoder memory usage increases roughly linearly from 274 MB for
a 60-frame video to 286 MB for a 300-frame video. The higher memory usage
of the encoder is due to the encoder storing an entire block of the host signal in
memory while the watermark signal is generated and added to the host. The
decoder simply reads one video frame at a time from the watermarked video.
5.1.5 AWGN Attack
A pirate may add noise to a watermarked video in an attempt to inhibit the
decoder’s ability to decode the watermark signal correctly. The objective of
this test is to evaluate the robustness of the digital watermarking technique
against the addition of zero-mean Gaussian noise to the watermarked video.
We refer to this attack as the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) attack.
For this test, we added zero-mean Gaussian noise to the pixel values of both
the Cb and Cr colour channels of each of the watermarked test videos. We then
input the AWGN-attacked videos to the watermark decoder, and calculated
the BER of the manually synchronised, and decoder synchronised messages.
We generated attacked videos with noise standard deviations of 8, 16, 24, and
32. These standard deviations are measured in pixel values, which lie in the
range {0, . . . , 255}.
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Figure 5.5: A watermarked video frame (top), and the AWGN-attacked version of
that frame with standard deviation σ = 32 (bottom).
Section 2.1.6 on page 14 discussed the robustness of the STDM technique
against the addition of a noise signal. We therefore expected that the water-
marking scheme would be very robust against the AWGN attack, and that the
BER would be very low. The results of the test showed that at each of the
noise standard deviations tested, the average BER for both colour channels
is zero, under both manual and decoder synchronisation, indicating that the
scheme is indeed very robust against the AWGN attack. Figure 5.5 shows
an AWGN-attacked video frame with the corresponding original watermarked
frame for comparison, in order to illustrate the level of noise to which the
scheme is robust. Additionally, in Section 5.1.2 the average variance of the
test video signals was found to be 13.96 for the Cb channel and 8.22 for the Cr
channel. The highest noise standard deviation tested was therefore more than
double the average standard deviation of the host signals, while the BER was
zero.
An undesirable side effect of the AWGN attack for the attacker is that
it reduces the ability of video compression algorithms to compress the at-
tacked video to a reasonable size, while maintaining reasonable quality. This
is because compression algorithms reduce the size of video files by exploiting
redundancy between video frames. Adding Gaussian noise to a video adds
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variation between pixels that reduces the amount of redundancy in the video,
and therefore reduces the effectiveness of video compression. It would be im-
practical for a pirate to attack the watermarking scheme using AWGN since
the resulting pirate copy would be of poor quality and poorly compressed.
5.1.6 Lossy Compression
The watermarking scheme is designed to process uncompressed digital video,
but an uncompressed format is impractical for storage and distribution of
digital video. This is because the pixel-by-pixel representation of the video
in uncompressed format requires a playback bit rate of about 700 megabits
per second (Mbps). A thirty-minute video at this bit rate would require 167
gigabytes (GB) of storage. Video compression algorithms are used to reduce
the number of bits used to represent a digital video signal. Lossy compression
algorithms trade off a loss in video quality for reduced bit rate.
In a practical media distribution scheme the CP would store and distribute
compressed digital videos. Therefore, in order for our prototype watermarking
scheme to be feasible for such a scheme, it should be robust against lossy video
compression. The objective of this test is to evaluate the robustness of the
watermarking scheme when the uncompressed watermarked video output by
the encoder is compressed using a lossy video compression algorithm. Since the
decoder is designed for uncompressed video, any received video is decompressed
prior to decoding.
We used avconv to compress the watermarked videos into MP4 format
using the h.264 [55] encoding algorithm. We tested the scheme at fixed video
bit rates of 30, 25, 20, 10, 5, 2, and 1 Mbps. Figure 5.6 shows an example of
the visual effect of compression on the watermarked video for a some of these
bit rates.
For this test, we expected that the BER would be low when the compressed
bit rate is high, and that, as the bit rate decreases, the BER would increase.
We also expected that the degradation of the STDM watermark signal due to
compression would cause the decoder to lose synchronisation at compressed
bit rates where the watermark message can still be decoded correctly under
manual synchronisation. This was expected to result in a greater BER under
decoder synchronisation than under manual synchronisation for a particular
compressed bit rate.
Figure 5.7 shows the decoder BER of the Cb and Cr colour channels, for
both manual synchronisation and decoder synchronisation. Under manual syn-
chronisation, the BER of the Cb channel is zero for compressed bit rates of 10
Mbps and above, and the BER of the Cr channel is zero for bit rates of 15
Mbps and above. Under decoder synchronisation errors start to occur at 15
Mbps for the Cb channel and at 25 Mbps for the Cr channel. As expected, the
BER is greater under decoder synchronisation than under manual synchroni-
sation for each bit rate. The BER of the Cr channel is also consistently worse
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Figure 5.6: Example of the visual effect of different compressed bit rates on the
watermarked video. At 15 Mbps, some small patches of blurring are noticeable. At
1 Mbps, the frame contains only severely blurred blocks of colour.
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Figure 5.7: Average bit error rate of the Cb and Cr colour channels vs. compressed
bit rate.
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than that of the Cb channel for both decoder and manual synchronisation.
For the rest of the tests in this section, we carried out the attacks on both
the uncompressed watermarked test videos, as well as a compressed version of
each watermarked test video. The tests on uncompressed video are intended
to show that the system works under ideal conditions, while the tests on the
compressed versions of the videos are intended to give an indication of the
performance of the scheme if it were implemented in a real-world digital video
distribution system. We chose the 30 Mbps, h.264-encoded MP4 format since
the average BER of the watermark signal in both colour channels is zero when
this compression is used. For the attacks on the uncompressed videos, the
attacked videos were also left uncompressed. For the attacks on the compressed
videos, the attacked videos were re-compressed to the same format as the
watermarked videos at 30 Mbps.
5.1.7 Spatial Resizing
A watermarked video may be resized in order to make it more suitable to a
particular display device. A pirate may also resize a watermarked video in
an attempt to desynchronise the watermark decoder or to destroy watermark
information that is encoded in higher spatial resolutions. The objective of
this test is to determine the robustness of the watermarking scheme against
resizing of the watermarked video. For this test, we assumed that the spatial
resolution of the watermarked video is the highest resolution that is useful
for display, and we only considered resizing operations that reduce the spatial
resolution of the watermarked video.
We generated five resized versions of each of the compressed and uncom-
pressed watermarked test videos. We resized the videos to spatial resolutions
of 1366×768, 1280×720, 960×540, 720×480, and 320×240. We then passed
each resized video to the watermark decoder and calculated the BER of the
decoded messages under manual and decoder synchronisation.
Since the watermark signal has a much lower spatial resolution than the
video signal, we expected that resizing would still preserve the watermark sig-
nal well enough to be decoded correctly. We therefore expected that the BER
of the resized videos would be low. The results of the test on the uncompressed
watermarked videos showed a BER of zero under both manual and decoder
synchronisation at all of the resolutions tested. This indicates that the low
resolution watermark signal as well as the decoder synchronisation algorithm
are robust against resizing when the video is uncompressed.
Figure 5.8 shows the BER vs. spatial resolution of the Cb colour channel
when the compressed watermarked videos were tested. Under manual synchro-
nisation, the BER is below one percent for resolutions above 720×480. At the
lowest resolution tested, 320×240, the watermark signal is severely corrupted,
with a BER of 0.35. The decoder synchronisation performed poorly, with a
BER of 0.39 at the highest resolution tested, 1366 × 768. Figure 5.9 shows
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Figure 5.8: Average bit error rate vs. spatial resolution of the Cb channels of the
compressed watermarked videos.
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Figure 5.9: Average bit error rate vs. spatial resolution of the Cr channels of the
compressed watermarked videos.
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the result for the Cr colour channel. The BER under manual synchronisation
is higher than that of the Cb channel, but still below four percent for resolu-
tions above 720 × 480. At 320 × 240, the BER is 0.41. Again, the decoder
synchronisation performed poorly, with a BER of 0.47 at 1366× 768.
For both colour channels of the compressed watermarked videos, the BER
under decoder synchronisation is much higher than under manual synchronisa-
tion, and the lowest bit error rates occur at exactly half the spatial resolution
of the original watermarked video, 960 × 540. This is likely due to the fact
that when resizing a compressed video, noise is added to the video signal by
the compression algorithm when the resized video is resampled. The loss due
to resampling is less when resizing by an integral factor [35].
5.1.8 Change of Frame Rate
The frame rate of a watermarked video may also be altered to suit a particular
display device. For example, in the NTSC standard used in North America,
29.97 FPS is used, whereas in the PAL standard used in much of Europe and
Africa, 25 FPS is used [35]. It is useful for the watermarking scheme to be
robust against changes of frame rate, so that the frame rate of existing wa-
termarked videos can simply be converted for distribution using a particular
standard, instead of having to generate different watermarked copies for each
standard. The objective of this test is to determine the robustness of the wa-
termarking scheme when the frame rate of the watermarked video is changed.
We generated four versions of each uncompressed watermarked test video
with frame rates of 10, 15, 20, and 25 FPS, as well as four versions of each
compressed watermarked test video with the same frame rates. We input
each of these attacked videos to the decoder and calculated the BER for the
manually synchronised and decoder synchronised decoded messages. For this
test, we expected that the BER would increase as the frame rate of the videos
decreases. We also expected that the BER would be very low at 25 FPS since
this is near to the original test video frame rate of 29.97 FPS.
For the uncompressed versions of the test videos, we found the average
BER to be zero at each frame rate tested under both manual and decoder
synchronisation. This indicates that the temporal resolution of the watermark
signal is low enough that the interpolation performed by the video encoder
when changing the frame rate of the uncompressed watermarked videos has
little effect on the STDM signal.
Figure 5.10 shows the BER vs. frame rate of the Cb channel of the com-
pressed watermarked test videos. Under manual synchronisation, the BER is
1.25× 10−4 at 25 FPS, and increases with decreasing frame rate to 0.20 at 10
FPS. The BER under decoder synchronisation is 0.1 at 25 FPS, and is higher
than the BER under manual synchronisation for each frame rate except 15
FPS. Figure 5.11 shows the decoder BER vs. frame rate of the Cr channel of
the compressed watermarked test videos. The BER under manual synchroni-
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Figure 5.10: Average bit error rate vs. frame rate of the Cb channels of the com-
pressed watermarked videos.
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Figure 5.11: Average bit error rate vs. frame rate of the Cr channels of the com-
pressed watermarked videos.
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sation is low at 25 FPS, with a value of 1.88 × 10−4, and increases to 0.20 at
10 FPS. The BER under decoder synchronisation is similar to that of the Cb
channel, with a value of 0.14 at 25 FPS.
At 15 FPS, the decoder BER is lower under decoder synchronisation than
under manual synchronisation for both colour channels. This is likely due
to the locations and sizes of the watermarked blocks within the video being
slightly altered by the resampling of the video compression algorithm when the
frame rate is changed. In this case, the decoder synchronisation was able to
find a better estimate of the actual parameters of the watermark signal than
the parameters with which the watermark was embedded.
5.1.9 Random Frame Deletion
The objective of this test is to evaluate the robustness of the watermarking
scheme against the random deletion of video frames from a watermarked video.
This type of attack may be carried out by a pirate in an attempt to desynchro-
nise the watermark decoder or to destroy any watermark message bits encoded
in the deleted frames.
For this test, we generated attacked versions of each uncompressed water-
marked test video, and each compressed watermarked test video by uniformly
randomly selecting frames from each video and removing them. We generated
attacked versions with five, ten, fifteen, and twenty percent of the frames in
each test video removed. We input the attacked videos into the decoder and
calculated the BER of the decoded messages produced under decoder synchro-
nisation.
Figure 5.12 shows the average BER vs. the percentage of frames dropped
for the Cb and Cr channels of the uncompressed watermarked videos. The BER
of the Cb channel is zero at a frame drop rate of five percent, and increases
with increasing drop rate to 0.17 at a drop rate of twenty percent. The BER
of the Cr channel is also zero at a drop rate of five percent, and increases to
0.13 at a drop rate of twenty percent.
Figure 5.13 shows the result for the compressed watermarked videos. The
BER for both colour channels is higher at each drop rate than for the un-
compressed test videos, and decoder synchronisation performs poorly for both
colour channels. The BER at a drop rate of five percent is 0.15 and 0.22
for the Cb and Cr channels, respectively. The high BER may be due to the
combined effect of the video compression and the frame dropping resulting in
too much noise for the decoder to synchronise properly. The robustness of the
scheme against frame dropping may possibly be improved by further reducing
the temporal resolution of the watermark signal.
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Figure 5.12: Average bit error rate vs. percentage of frames randomly deleted from
the Cb and Cr channels of the uncompressed watermarked videos.
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Figure 5.13: Average bit error rate vs. percentage of frames randomly deleted from
the Cb and Cr channels of the compressed watermarked videos.
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5.1.10 Gain and Noise Attack
The objective of this test is to evaluate the robustness of the digital water-
marking technique against scaling of the pixel values of the Cb and Cr colour
channels by a constant factor α, as well as the addition of noise to the scaled
signal. In Section 2.1.7 on page 16 it was shown that scaling the amplitude of
a QIM-based watermark signal is particularly effective at inducing decoding
errors. In our watermarking scheme, the decoder estimates the factor by which
the pixel values of the watermarked video signal have been scaled, and adjusts
the quantiser step size used for decoding accordingly. An attacker may try
to inhibit the decoder’s ability to estimate the applied gain factor by adding
noise to the gain-attacked video. The ability of the decoder to compensate
for the applied gain determines the robustness of the watermarking scheme to
gain attacks.
We first tested that the scheme is capable of decoding watermark messages
from uncompressed watermarked videos that have been subjected to constant
amplitude scaling and the addition of Gaussian noise. We generated five at-
tacked versions of each uncompressed watermarked test video by scaling the
pixel values of the Cb and Cr colour channels by gain factors of 0.85, 0.90,
0.95, 1.05, 1.10, 1.15. We then added Gaussian noise with standard deviations
of 8, 16, 24, and 32, and input each gain and noise-attacked video into the
decoder. Under both manual and decoder synchronisation, the average BER
was zero for all gains and noise levels tested. This result was expected since
in Section 5.1.5, the addition of Gaussian noise was found to be ineffective
at inducing bit errors in the decoded watermark messages. The uncompressed
gain-attacked videos still contained strongly quantised STDM signals on which
the decoder could synchronise.
Because of the impracticality and ineffectiveness of adding Gaussian noise
to the videos, when testing the compressed watermarked videos, we assumed
that the attacker uses lossy video compression to induce the noise. As the
bit rate to which a video is compressed increases, the amount of noise added
to the video signal increases. We generated five attacked versions of each
compressed watermarked test video by scaling the pixel values of the Cb and
Cr colour channels by gain factors of 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 1.05, 1.10, 1.15. We then
compressed each of these attacked videos to bit rates of 30, 25, 20, 15, 10, and
5 Mbps to add increasing levels of noise to the attacked videos. We input the
gain and noise-attacked videos into the decoder and calculated the BER for
the manually synchronised and decoder synchronised decoded messages.
For this test, we expected that the results would be similar to those of
the lossy compression test in Section 5.1.6 since the noise caused by the video
compression should be similar, and, as discussed in Section 2.1.7 on page 16,
constant gain scaling only changes the effective quantiser step size of the STDM
signal. This means that the watermark message should not be corrupted by
the pixel value scaling and, if the decoder can estimate α correctly, then it
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Figure 5.14: Average bit error rate vs. compressed bit rate of the Cb channel when
subjected to amplitude scaling by a constant gain factor α.
should be able to decode the message correctly. However, one possible source
of error is clipping of the scaled pixel values to lie within the range {0, . . . , 255}
to be stored as byte values in the digital video file. This may result in some
of the STDM values not being perfectly scaled by α.
Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 show the average BER at each compressed
video bit rate for the Cb and Cr channels, respectively. For the Cb channel,
under manual synchronisation, the mean BER over all values of α is zero at
compressed bit rates above 15 Mbps, and increases with decreasing bit rate to
0.07 at a bit rate of 5 Mbps. The mean BER under decoder synchronisation is
0.02 at 30 Mbps, and increases with decreasing bit rate to 0.35 at 5 Mbps. For
the Cr channel, under manual synchronisation, the mean BER over all values
of α is zero at 30 Mbps, and increases with decreasing bit rate to 0.14 at a bit
rate of 5 Mbps. The mean BER under decoder synchronisation is 0.06 at 30
Mbps, and increases with decreasing bit rate to 0.40 at 5 Mbps.
The manual synchronisation results were similar to the results of the lossy
compression test in Section 5.1.6, but BER under decoder synchronisation was
greater for this test than for the lossy compression test, with errors already oc-
curring at a bit rate of 30 Mbps. The high BER under decoder synchronisation
is likely due to the noise induced by the recompression of the gain-attacked,
compressed watermarked videos being too great to allow the decoder to syn-
chronise properly on the STDM signal.
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Figure 5.15: Average bit error rate vs. compressed bit rate of the Cr channel when
subjected to amplitude scaling by a constant gain factor α.
5.1.11 Recompression
A compressed watermarked video may be recompressed using a different com-
pression algorithm. This may be done in order to change the format of a
digital video to suit a particular display device, or it may be done by a pirate
with the intention of destroying the embedded watermark signal. The objec-
tive of this test is to determine the robustness of the watermarking scheme to
recompression of compressed watermarked videos.
For this test, we recompressed the compressed watermarked test videos,
using the MPEG4 video compression algorithm. We compressed the test videos
to bit rates of 30 Mbps, 20 Mbps, 15 Mbps, and 10 Mbps. Bit rates lower than
10 Mbps were not achievable using MPEG4 compression for the resolution and
frame rate of the test videos. We input the attacked videos into the decoder
and calculated the BER for the decoded messages produced under manual and
decoder synchronisation.
Figure 5.16 shows the BER vs. bit rate of the recompressed videos. Under
manual synchronisation, the BER for the Cb channel increases with decreasing
bit rate from 0.03 at 30 Mbps to 0.12 at 10 Mbps, and the BER for the Cr
channel increases from 0.06 at 30 Mbps to 0.17 at 10 Mbps. The robustness of
the scheme under decoder synchronisation is poor, with a BER of 0.19 at 30
Mbps for the Cb channel, and a BER of 0.30 at 30 Mbps for the Cr channel.
The noise induced by the compression and recompression of the watermarked
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Figure 5.16: Average bit error rate of the Cb and Cr channels vs. bit rate of the
videos recompressed using MPEG4 compression.
video is too great for the decoder to synchronise properly, and even under
manual synchronisation there are decoding errors even at the highest bit rate
tested. The watermarking parameters may need to be modified to improve
the robustness of a production version of this prototype scheme against re-
compression.
5.1.12 Horizontal Cropping
The digital watermarking scheme is not specifically designed to be robust
against cropping of watermarked videos. However, determining the inher-
ent robustness of the scheme is useful for future work that focusses on ways
of modifying the scheme to be robust against cropping. In this thesis, we
considered two kinds of cropping, which we refer to as horizontal and vertical
cropping. Horizontal cropping is the removal of rows of pixels from the top
and bottom of each frame, and vertical cropping is the removal of columns of
pixels from the left and right of each frame. Figure 5.17 illustrates these two
cropping techniques.
The objective of this test is to determine the robustness of the scheme to
horizontal cropping. We first generated cropped versions of each uncompressed
watermarked video by removing 8, 16, 24, and 32 rows of pixels from both the
top and bottom of each frame. We input the cropped videos into the decoder
and calculated the BER under manual and decoder synchronisation. We then
repeated the test using the compressed watermarked test videos.
We expected that the BER under decoder synchronisation would be very
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Horizontal cropping Vertical cropping
Figure 5.17: Illustration of horizontal and vertical cropping. The shaded regions are
the bands from which pixels are removed by the corresponding cropping operation.
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Figure 5.18: Average bit error rate of the Cb and Cr channels vs. number of rows
of pixels removed from the top and bottom of the uncompressed watermarked videos
by horizontal cropping.
high, even for a small number of pixels removed. This is because the synchro-
nisation system is not designed to detect cropping. We also expected that the
BER under manual synchronisation would be high due to the misalignment of
the STDM chip signals with the watermark signals in the cropped videos.
Figure 5.18 shows the average BER of the Cb and Cr channels vs. the num-
ber of rows of pixels removed from the uncompressed watermarked videos. The
BER of the Cb channel is zero under both manual and decoder synchronisation
for a crop depth of eight pixels. As expected, the BER under decoder synchro-
nisation is higher than the BER under manual synchronisation, increasing with
crop depth to 0.50 at a crop depth of 32 pixels. The BER of the Cr channel is
zero under both manual and decoder synchronisation for crop depths of eight
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Figure 5.19: Average bit error rate of the Cb and Cr channels vs. number of rows
of pixels removed from the top and bottom of the compressed watermarked videos
by horizontal cropping.
and sixteen pixels. Again, the BER under decoder synchronisation is higher
than the BER under manual synchronisation, increasing with crop depth to
0.47 at a crop depth of 32 pixels.
Figure 5.19 shows the average BER for the Cb and Cr channels vs. the
number of rows of pixels removed from the compressed watermarked videos. As
the number of cropped pixels increases, the BER under manual synchronisation
rises from 3.13× 10−4 to 0.22 for the Cb channel, and from 3.75× 10−4 to 0.21
for the Cr channel. As expected, the BER under decoder synchronisation is
much higher than under manual synchronisation, rising from 0.21 to 0.50 for
the Cb channel, and from 0.30 to 0.49 for the Cr channel.
5.1.13 Vertical Cropping
The objective of this test is to determine the robustness of the scheme to
vertical cropping. We first generated cropped versions of each uncompressed
watermarked video by removing 8, 16, 24, and 32 columns of pixels from both
the left and right of each frame. We input the cropped videos into the decoder
and calculated the BER under manual and decoder synchronisation. We then
repeated the test using the compressed watermarked test videos.
Figure 5.20 shows the average BER of the Cb and Cr channels vs. the
number of columns of pixels removed from the uncompressed watermarked
videos. The results are similar to the test above. The BER of both channels
under manual and decoder synchronisation is zero for a crop depth of eight
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Figure 5.20: Average bit error rate of the Cb and Cr channels vs. number of columns
of pixels removed from the left and right of the uncompressed watermarked videos
by vertical cropping.
pixels. Again, the BER under decoder synchronisation is higher than the BER
under manual synchronisation. At a crop depth of 32 pixels, the BER under
decoder synchronisation is 0.50 for the Cb channel, and 0.48 for the Cr channel.
Figure 5.21 shows the average BER of the Cb and Cr channels vs. the
number of columns of pixels removed from the compressed watermarked videos
by vertical cropping. As the number of cropped pixels increases, the BER
under manual synchronisation rises from 2.5×10−4 to 0.23 for the Cb channel,
and from 6.25× 10−5 to 0.21 for the Cr channel. Once again, the BER under
decoder synchronisation is much higher than under manual synchronisation,
rising from 0.19 to 0.50 for the Cb channel, and from 0.28 to 0.47 for the Cr
channel.
The results of this test and the test above show that, while the decoder
synchronisation performs poorly, the manually synchronised watermark signal
is still somewhat robust under the cropping parameters tested. Additionally,
for the uncompressed test videos, the BER under decoder synchronisation was
still zero for the lowest crop depth tested. The decoder could be modified in
the future to allow it to synchronise more effectively with watermark signals
in cropped videos. A decoder modified in this way could theoretically decode
watermark messages with BER similar to the BER under manual synchroni-
sation.
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Figure 5.21: Average bit error rate of the Cb and Cr channels vs. number of columns
of pixels removed from the left and right of the compressed watermarked videos by
vertical cropping.
5.1.14 Discussion
In this section we tested the robustness of the watermarking scheme against
several attacks and video processing operations. We showed that when the
watermarked videos remain uncompressed, the watermarking scheme works as
expected and is robust against all of the attacks tested. We also showed that
when the watermarked videos are compressed, and the attacks are not too
severe, a low watermark message BER can be achieved under manual synchro-
nisation, which means that the watermark signals are capable of remaining
mostly uncorrupted in the attacked compressed videos.
For the tests carried out on compressed watermarked videos, the BER un-
der decoder synchronisation was generally much higher than the BER under
manual synchronisation. This indicates that the STDM signals in the attacked
videos correctly encoded most of the watermark message data, but the signals
were too noisy to be detected during decoder synchronisation. Video compres-
sion algorithms are designed to remove information from digital video signals
that is barely noticeable to the viewer [6], and since the watermark signal is
intended not to be noticeable, compression can severely degrade the STDM
watermark signals. The losses incurred in resampling and recompressing the
attacked videos may also have added noise to the STDM signal. The robust-
ness of decoder synchronisation with compressed watermarked videos could be
improved by increasing the quantiser step size (which would lower the raw bit
rate of the watermark signal), or by incorporating other means of synchronisa-
tion into the watermark message bits. For example, some of the bits encoded
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into each block can be used to assist the decoder in identifying that block.
For most of the tests carried out on the compressed versions of the water-
marked test videos, watermarks embedded in the Cr channel incurred a greater
BER than those embedded in the Cb channel. In Section 5.1.2 it was shown
that the average variance of the Cb channels of the unmarked test videos is
more than twice as high as that of the Cr channels. The Cb channels of the test
videos may be less affected by lossy compression than the Cr channels, due
to the video compression algorithm preserving more of the Cb signal, whose
power contributes more to the video signal, and discarding more of Cr channel,
whose power contributes less. In a more developed watermarking scheme, the
watermark encoder can be designed to detect how suitable a particular colour
channel is for watermarking by calculating the variance of each channel. The
parameters of the watermark embedded into each channel can then be adjusted
according to the properties of the channel.
5.2 The Dynamic Traitor Tracing Scheme
In this section we compare the performance of our dynamic traitor tracing
scheme to that of the FT scheme. Our scheme uses a delay-tolerant search
tree algorithm, described in Section 3.2.1 on page 39, to partition the users in
U , and the dynamic Tardos code construction, described in Section 3.2.3 on
page 44, to generate watermark messages for each segment variant. The FT
scheme uses the search tree algorithm described in Section 2.2.6 on page 26.
In order to compare the schemes more fairly, we use the dynamic Tardos code
construction, described in Section 2.2.5 on page 24, to generate watermark
messages for video segment watermarking in the FT scheme. This ensures
that the optimised Tardos constants are the same for our scheme and for the
FT scheme.
5.2.1 Methodology
We tested the dynamic traitor tracing schemes by running computer simu-
lations of broadcasts of watermarked content to a set of users. We ran 10
computer simulations of each collusion attack scenario and averaged the re-
sults. For each simulation, we randomly selected a set of users to be group
of colluding pirates who carry out a collusion attack on the watermarked con-
tent, and rebroadcast the content. For these simulations we assumed that
the underlying digital watermark modulation scheme complies with the mark-
ing assumption, discussed in Section 2.2.1.2 on page 19, and that the correct
watermark message bits can be decoded from the received pirate copies. We
therefore did not physically watermark video content, but we represented the
watermarked content assigned to each user by the watermark message itself.
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The intended advantage of our scheme over the FT scheme is that the
time required by our scheme to disconnect all colluding pirates is shorter than
the standard scheme when feedback from the pirate redistribution is delayed.
Since our computer simulations did not run in real-time using actual broadcast
video, we could not directly measure the time taken for each scheme to trace
and disconnect all pirates. Instead, we made use of the assumption we made
in Section 2.2.7 on page 28 that the watermarking bit rate is constant at rwm
bits per second. Using this assumption, the time taken to trace all pirates
is proportional to the number of watermark bits transmitted to each user, so
we use this as our metric for the time required to trace all pirates. We also
express the feedback delay between segment transmission and the receipt of
pirate segments in terms of watermark message bits.
In addition to measuring the number of watermark message bits transmit-
ted to each user, for each simulation, we also measured the total number of
watermark message bits transmitted by the scheme. We calculated the total
number of watermark bits transmitted during a video segment as the product
of the number of variants of the video segment and the watermark message
length for that segment. The total number of bits transmitted was then cal-
culated as the sum of the total bits transmitted during every segment.
5.2.2 Random Bit Selection
Section 2.2.1.2 on page 19 discussed the bit selection collusion attack. One
strategy the pirates can use to select the watermark message bits with which
they construct the pirate rebroadcast is to randomly select between the wa-
termark bits present in all of the videos available to them. The objective of
this test is to evaluate the performance of our dynamic traitor tracing scheme
when the pirates use this random bit selection strategy.
The simulated pirates generated the collusion-attacked watermark mes-
sages as follows. For each bit in the collusion-attacked watermark message,
where the pirates had access to both the ‘1’ and ‘0’ version, the value of the
bit retransmitted by the pirates was independently randomly chosen to be ‘1’
with a probability of 0.5. For each bit where the pirates had access to only
one version, that version was retransmitted, in accordance with the marking
assumption. The traitor tracing scheme received feedback from the simulated
pirate rebroadcast after a time delay, tdelay, corresponding to a number of wa-
termark message bits, bdelay. We tested the scheme for bdelay values of 0, 2000,
4000, 6000, 8000, and 10000 bits.
Figure 5.22 shows the number of watermark message bits transmitted to
each user by our scheme and by the FT scheme in order to trace all pirates
vs. the amount of feedback delay from the pirate redistribution, when the bit
selection collusion attack is used. For this test, the total number of users was
106. From the results we can see that our scheme requires fewer equivalent
watermark bits to be transmitted to each user when feedback is delayed. This
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Figure 5.22: Number of watermark message bits transmitted to each user by each
scheme vs. feedback delay, bdelay, when the random bit selection collusion strategy
is used. The total number of users, Nu, is 106, and the number of colluding pirates
is Nc.
means that our scheme requires less broadcast time to trace all of the pirates
than the FT scheme.
Figure 5.23 shows the total number of bits transmitted by our scheme and
by the FT scheme. This result shows that the total number of bits transmitted
by our scheme is more than that of the FT scheme. This is due to the fact that
our scheme uses more watermarked variants per segment than the FT scheme.
5.2.3 Scapegoat Strategy
Another strategy the pirates may employ is to rebroadcast the video segments
received by one of the members of C until that member is disconnected, and
then to start rebroadcasting the video received by the next member, and so
on. In [16] this strategy is referred to as the scapegoat strategy since the
pirate whose watermarked content is rebroadcast until disconnection acts as a
scapegoat for the others.
For this test, the simulated pirates generated the collusion-attacked water-
mark messages as follows. One pirate in C was selected at random to be the
scapegoat. For each bit in the collusion-attacked watermark message, the bit
retransmitted by the pirates was chosen to be the watermark bit received by
the scapegoat pirate. When the scapegoat was disconnected, another scape-
goat was chosen at random, and the collusion attack continued until all pirates
were disconnected. The traitor tracing scheme received feedback from the sim-
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Figure 5.23: Total number of watermark message bits transmitted by each scheme
vs. feedback delay, bdelay, when the random bit selection collusion strategy is used.
The total number of users, Nu, is 106, and the number of colluding pirates is Nc.
ulated pirate rebroadcast after a time delay, tdelay, corresponding to a number
of watermark message bits, bdelay. We tested the scheme for bdelay values of 0,
2000, 4000, 6000, 8000, and 10000 bits.
Figure 5.24 shows the number of watermark message bits transmitted to
each user by our scheme and by the FT scheme in order to trace all pirates vs.
the amount of feedback delay from the pirate redistribution, when the scape-
goat strategy is used. For this test, the total number of users was 106. Our
scheme once again requires fewer equivalent watermark bits to be transmitted
to each user, and therefore, less broadcast time, than the FT scheme, when
feedback is delayed. Figure 5.25 shows the total number of bits transmitted by
our scheme and by the FT scheme. As in the previous test, the total number
of bits transmitted by our scheme is more than that of the FT scheme, due to
the extra watermarked variants used.
5.2.4 Discussion
In broadcast digital distribution systems, where it is impractical to transmit
unique watermark messages to each user, partitioning the users into sets using
the FT scheme can allow a set of Nc colluding pirates to be traced using a
maximum of 2Nc+1 simultaneous unique watermark messages [18]. The results
of the tests in this section show that when using Tardos codes to construct
watermark messages, the traitor tracing scheme we implemented provides a
trade-off between the time taken for the scheme to disconnect all colluding
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Figure 5.24: Number of watermark message bits transmitted to each user by each
scheme vs. feedback delay, bdelay, when the scapegoat collusion strategy is used. The
total number of users, Nu, is 106, and the number of colluding pirates is Nc.
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Figure 5.25: Total number of watermark message bits transmitted by each scheme
vs. feedback delay, bdelay, when the scapegoat collusion strategy is used. The total
number of users, Nu, is 106, and the number of colluding pirates is Nc.
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pirates, and the total watermarking bandwidth used, when compared to the
FT scheme. If a broadcast scheme that uses dynamic traitor tracing is capable
of supporting the extra total bandwidth, then our traitor tracing scheme can
be used to disconnect all colluding pirates more quickly than the FT scheme.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis we designed and implemented a prototype digital watermarking
scheme for embedding hidden binary message signals in uncompressed digital
video. We tested the robustness of the scheme when watermarked videos are
modified by video processing techniques, as well as by intentional attacks on
the scheme. The scheme was shown to be robust against the attacks tested
when the watermarked and attacked videos remained uncompressed. However,
when the attacks were carried out on the compressed versions of watermark
videos, decoder synchronisation performed poorly, and bit error rates were
high. In order to develop the prototype scheme into a production watermark-
ing system, robustness to attack when using compressed videos needs to be
increased.
In order to protect digitally watermarked broadcast video from collusion
attack we also designed and implemented a modified version of Fiat and Tassa’s
dynamic traitor tracing algorithm for generating watermark messages. The
test results show that the new scheme is capable of tracing and disconnecting
all colluding pirates more quickly than the FT scheme when feedback from
the pirate rebroadcast is delayed, at the expense of using more watermarked
segment variants and, therefore, a greater total watermark message bandwidth.
6.1 Future Work
If the prototype scheme implemented in this thesis is to be developed into
a production digital watermarking scheme, there are some features that still
need to be added or improved. Below are some suggestions for improving and
extending the scheme in future work.
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6.1.1 Optimisation of Watermark Modulation
Parameters
The parameters chosen in Section 4.1 on page 50 for the watermark modulation
scheme were somewhat arbitrary and therefore do not necessarily provide an
optimal trade-off between fidelity, security, and robustness. Parameters such
as the temporal and spatial resolution of the chip signals and the number of
watermark message bits encoded into each block could be optimised to provide
the best trade-off between robustness, fidelity, and data payload. The scheme
can also be modified so that the watermarking parameters can vary between
blocks in order to best suit the characteristics of each block.
6.1.2 Improvement of Robustness to Cropping
The decoder synchronisation of our watermarking scheme does not take frame
cropping into account, and therefore the BER under decoder synchronisation is
high even for minor cropping attacks. The BER under manual synchronisation
is low for the cropping attacks tested, which means that the system could be
modified to synchronise with a cropped video signal, and achieve a low BER.
One possible solution is to let the watermark signal encoded in each frame
be spatially smaller than the video frame itself and centred within the frame
so that vertical and horizontal bands of pixels around the edge of the frame
contain no watermark signal. Any cropping operation that only removes pixels
from the un-watermarked bands would not damage the watermark signal. The
decoder would still require a method of achieving spatial synchronisation with
the watermark signal, since cropping may change the position and relative size
of the watermarked region within each frame. A method similar to the one
used by our decoder to achieve temporal synchronisation might be appropriate.
6.1.3 Improvement of Robustness to Compression
Our watermark modulation scheme is designed to operate on uncompressed
digital video. This has the advantage that the scheme is not dependent on any
particular video compression algorithm or compressed video format. However,
knowledge of how video compression algorithms work could be used to improve
the robustness of the scheme against video compression in general, or against
particular compression algorithms in specific cases where this is sufficient. Our
scheme, or at least the parameters thereof, could be modified so that the water-
mark signal is strong in regions of the host video signal that are least affected
by compression, and weak or not present in regions that are heavily affected
by compression. Another reason to make the scheme “aware” of compression
algorithms is to prevent the watermark signal from significantly increasing the
size of the watermarked video file over that of the unmarked host video file.
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6.1.4 Incorporation of a Perceptual Model
In this thesis we focussed mainly on the robustness of our digital watermarking
scheme. While we measured the level of distortion induced in the videos by
the watermarks in terms of DWR, we did not consider the perceptibility of
this distortion to a viewer. A perceptual model can be used as a means of
determining the level of noticeable distortion induced in a host video, and
to improve the simple method used by our prototype watermark encoder to
distribute the watermark signal within the host.
The random choice of Ω′ki , the set of coordinates for which the watermark
signal is non-zero, made in Section 3.1.4 on page 33, can be substituted for a
choice that selects locations in vk for which the added watermark signal will
be least noticeable to a user. The method we chose for upsampling the low
resolution watermark signal, w˜(u)k [x, y, t], to give the high resolution signal,
w
(u)
k [x, y, t], is also very simple and does not take advantage of knowledge of
the host signal. In a more developed version of our watermarking scheme,
the high resolution watermark signal can be generated from the low resolution
signal in a way that blends in better with the host signal. This would improve
the fidelity of the watermarking scheme.
6.1.5 Digital Layer
In this thesis we implemented a digital watermark modulation scheme that
can embed an arbitrary message into a host signal, and decode those bits from
the (possibly distorted) watermarked signal. A logical next step would be to
develop a digital communication protocol which uses the available watermark
bits in an optimal way to provide robustness against bit errors, as well as a large
enough data payload to carry useful user-identifying information. The protocol
may include forward error correction, and template sequences that can assist
in decoder synchronisation. Some type of packet-based system may enable the
decoder to reconstruct messages from out-of-order watermark blocks, and may
allow packets to be repeated to allow successful decoding when some packets
are lost.
The decoding algorithm described in Section 3.1.8 on page 39 uses hard-
decision decoding for each bit. Since the determination of each received bit
value relies on a decision score, forward error correction using soft-decision
decoding can be implemented. In [56] it is shown that soft-decision decoding
can improve the probability of successful watermark decoding. The quantisa-
tion metric, β, generated by the gain estimator described in Section 3.1.7 on
page 37, can also be used as a parameter when determining the most likely
estimate of the watermark message signal.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 85
6.1.6 Implementation in Broadcast Systems
Our prototype implementation was developed in Python, and tested using
computer simulation. If the scheme is to be implemented in pay-TV broadcast
systems then some of the software may need to be rewritten to run on the set-
top box hardware used by the pay-TV system. Another issue is the method by
which the common video content and unique watermarks will be transmitted
to the users. Broadcast encryption schemes, such as the one presented in [48],
allow authorised users to access a broadcast, while denying access to unautho-
rised users. However, these schemes are not designed to deliver unique copies
to each authorised user.
Adapting broadcast encryption schemes to include multiple watermarked
copies by simply broadcasting each watermarked copy may require unaccept-
ably large bandwidth. Broadcasting the original content and relying on the
set-top box itself to embed the watermarks would require less extra bandwidth,
but the CP would have to take measures to secure the unmarked content so
that only the watermarked versions generated by set-top boxes can be accessed.
This may place unrealistic security and tamper-resistance requirements on set-
top box hardware.
A digital watermarking scheme for internet multicast is proposed in [57],
and may be modified for a broadcast setting. In this scheme two differently
encrypted versions of the original content are generated and distributed to
users. The first version is digitally watermarked with a message consisting of
only 1’s, and the second is watermarked with a message containing only 0’s.
The parts of each version corresponding to individual bits are encrypted using
different keys. For each watermark message bit, each set-top box can only
decrypt the corresponding part from one of the watermarked versions. The
set-top box combines the parts it can decrypt into a uniquely watermarked
video. This scheme requires that no more than two versions of the same con-
tent be broadcast, and the unmarked content is never exposed, but additional
bandwidth is required to make the correct decryption keys available to each
set-top box. In this case a traitor tracing scheme such as the one implemented
in this thesis can be used to generate the sets of decryption keys.
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